| This research moves beyond the existing literature on the politics of economic reform and specifically trade policy by focusing on the recent aggressive use of antidumping (AD) policy in the developing world. Evidence suggests that governments have been simultaneously "reforming" trade on the level of macroeconomic policy by slashing tariffs while adopting mechanisms that might serve to slow or even reverse trade liberalization at the less visible level of regulatory policy. There are not, however, adequate explanations for variation in nations' sudden use of these non-tariff policies, particularly in developing nations, nor have the determinants of the decision to provide protection been clearly identified.; In order to explore this puzzle, this dissertation draws theoretically upon interest group approaches and institutional explanations while considering systematically and synthetically the implications of changing macroeconomic contexts and governments' own sets of preferences.; I test the theoretical propositions by utilizing a research design that combines an in-depth qualitative and quantitative comparison of AD policy in three major developing countries---Argentina, Mexico, and South Africa---with a large-n, cross-national statistical analysis of the political and economic determinants of levels of non-tariff trade protection across the developing world. Focusing upon variation in agencies' general propensity to protect, this research demonstrates ways in which interest group pressure and institutional context shape policy implementation. The country cases examine systematically national- and sub-national level variables that likely condition the trade policy process by combining in-depth interviews with relevant actors and empirical analysis of national trade policy outputs. |
