| GENCOs in restructured systems are compensated for selling energy in the market. In a restructured market, a mechanism is required to entice participants in the market to provide ancillary services and to ensure adequate compensation that would guarantee its economic viability.; The ISO controls the dispatch of generation, manages the reliability of the transmission grid, provides open access to the transmission, buys and provides ancillary services as required, coordinates day-ahead, hour-ahead schedules and performs real time balancing of load and generation, settles real time imbalances and ancillary services sales and purchases. The ISO, also, administers congestion management protocols for the transmission grid.; Since the ISO does not own any generating units it must ensure that there is enough reserves for maintaining reliability according to FERC regulations, and sufficient unloaded generating capacity for balancing services in a real-time market. The ISO could meet these requirements by creating a competitive market for ancillary services, which are metered and remain unbundled to provide an accurate compensation for each supplier and cost to each consumer,; In this study, we give an overview for restructuring and ancillary services in a restructured power marketplace. Also, we discuss the effect of GENCOs' actions in the competitive energy and ancillary service markets. In addition, we propose an auction market design for hedging ancillary service costs in California market. Furthermore, we show how to include the n-1 and voltage contingencies in security constrained unit commitment. Finally, we present two approaches for GENCOs' unit commitment in a restructured power market; one is based on game theory and the other is based on market price forecasting. In each of the two GENCOs' unit commitment approaches, we discuss the GENCOs' optimal bidding strategies in energy and ancillary service markets to maximize the GENCOs' profit. |
