The place of humanity in ethics: Combined insights from Mencius and Hume

I present and defend a naturalist, internalist, and realist theory of the foundations of ethics. The theory, grounded in a particular concept of humanity, combines features of the Mencian and the Humean moral traditions.;An acceptable moral theory must contain accounts of (i) human nature and (ii) moral phenomenology. The former includes analyses of moral agency and moral psychology, the latter the nature of moral perception and the meaning of moral language. Both Mencius and Hume offer moral theories that attempt to meet these conditions. Neither, however, is entirely successful. Following Mencius and Hume, I defend the position that a moral judgment ascribes---truly or falsely---a definable and natural (empirical) quality to an action, object, or person.;I further argue that a true moral judgment must be made on the perceptual basis of the moral judge under normal conditions . These normal conditions are the conditions under which the sentiment of humanity is called for and expected. What is humanity? Hume describes humanity as consistent sympathy. We find ourselves very often extending sympathy to a friend, but not so often to a stranger. Humanity requires us to extend sympathy to all people consistently. Interpreted this way, Hume's concept is similar to Mencius' concept of humanity (Ren). Though similar, Hume and Mencius offer different accounts of certain aspects of humanity. On the one hand, Hume explains the cognitive importance of characteristically human feelings and the relation between humanity and reason. On the other, Mencius presents a theory of the actualization of humanity through self-cultivation. Mencius also makes it explicit that humanity, as the unity of virtues, is the single force by which all human activities achieve their integrity.;The Ontological and epistemological commitments in this dissertation make an internalism not just possible but unavoidable. With regard to the relation between moral judgments and motivation or reasons for action, there are two positions: an (often) irrealist position, namely, internalism, and a realist position, namely, externalism. Internalism is the claim that there is an analytic connection between moral judgments and motivation or reasons for action; but externalism denies the necessary connection. I contend that externalism is highly problematic for its inability to explain the motivational force of morality. I also contend that traditional internalism is not acceptable when it appeals to some forms of emotivism in rejecting moral realism because by doing so it falls into radical relativism and arbitrariness. (Abstract shortened by UMI.)...