Moral variety and plural theories

This dissertation defends a pluralistic approach to ethical theory. The claim is that more than one theory is required in giving an account of morality. The central argument is that a single theory cannot both account for the variety in moral experience and at the same time retain usefulness as a moral theory. We don't want to give up either of these goals (accounting for moral experience or creating useful theories) so we should give up the goal of having a single theory in ethics. Although having such a single theory is also a desirable goal, it is secondary to the other two goals. This conclusion is drawn in part from an analogy to the tasks and uses of theory in science and in part by a pragmatic argument.;The philosophical methodology endorsed in this dissertation is fundamentally pragmatic. It is assumed that any moral theory must be tested against moral experience in the following sense: it must be a theory that we can endorse given our understanding of morality. The use of the word "our" here is broad and does not imply moral relativism.;The argument takes place in the course of five chapters. The first chapter investigates the goals of moral theory. The second chapter argues that any single reductive moral theory will fail to meet these goals. The third chapter rejects the idea that we should stop theorizing about morality altogether. The fourth chapter argues against the possibility of endorsing any single moral theory given certain contingent facts about the human condition. The fifth and final chapter indicates one strategy that moral theorists might follow in establishing the plural ethical theories and also differentiates ethical theory pluralism from other philosophical positions that bear some similarity.