Executive spending power: Flexibility in obligation and outlay timing as a measure of federal budgetary and policy control

The examination of power in federal budgeting typically focuses on funding levels, pet policy initiatives, pork barrel spending, or the budget process itself. However, one important, though little-observed, indicator of power is called period of availability. This refers to the amount of time in fiscal years that the executive branch has to obligate funds.; The availability construct has a direct relationship to the most fundamental theories of political science, public administration, and budgeting. Separation of powers with checks and balances calls for Congressional decision making and executive implementation with reasonable controls and oversight. Obligation and outlay flexibility provides the executive discretion to use its expertise in program implementation (effectiveness) and administrative management (economy and efficiency). Scholars are concerned, however, about the rise of executive power, including relatively unknown power tools available to presidents such as executive orders, memoranda, proclamations, national security directives, and signing statements. Executive powers previously associated with international operations are now becoming part of America's domestic defense, and increases in law enforcement and intelligence gathering have quickly furthered executive power in overt and covert matters. Executive aggrandizement grows, with no foreseeable end in sight.; This research uses time series to examine several hundred accounts in eight federal agencies over a 30-year period. Specifically, it measures changes in period of availability and in account characteristics. The analysis provides a model for describing the change in the balance of power between the executive and legislative branches. This research uses a large database to analyze and describe historical trends that many previous researchers typically address using case studies and other qualitative approaches.; This research demonstrates that Congress is still very interested in controlling the executive by controlling the purpose of accounts and that the executive branch is gaining policy and budgetary power through increased flexibility in obligation and outlay timing. These findings will help researchers and practitioners to understand better how changes in funding control mechanisms impact the valued checks and balances between Congress and the executive.