| This study examines the politics of patron-client state relationships. Specifically, it examines the nature and use of influence between patron and client to determine whether these relationships are primarily coercive or persuasive (non-coercive). This study tests two models, the coercion and incentives models, using the United States-Israel relationship from 1948--1992 as a case study. The two models are compared to determine which model offers greater utility for describing and explaining patron-client relations. This study argues that the incentives model offers greater utility for explaining patron-client influence dynamics. A systematic review of crucial interactions in the U.S.-Israel relationship over time illustrates that the incentives model, rather than the coercion model, is more consistent with the approach utilized by the patron in successful influence attempts. Additionally, the dominant flow of influence in these relationships is found to be from the patron to the client, rather than the reverse. |
