| This dissertation examines the interaction between anti-communism and ideologies of development in the construction of U.S.-Indonesian relations during the 1960s. It argues that the political strategies of the Kennedy and Johnson Administrations for Indonesia were grounded not just in anti-communism and geopolitics but in a discourse of modernization, which provided both a cultural and ideological frame of reference and a set of policy prescriptions considered appropriate for Indonesia's "stage" of economic and political development and its role in the world economy. Utilizing a wealth of newly declassified documents, I explore the Kennedy Administration's efforts to lure Sukarno into closer political and economic relations with the West, the gradual collapse of U.S.-Indonesian relations from 1963 to 1965, and the Johnson Administration's embrace of the New Order regime of General Suharto. I demonstrate how, both prior to and following Suharto's rise to power and the destruction of the Indonesian Communist Party in late 1965, U.S. officials and broader constituencies such as foreign investors justified their support for a military-dominated government as a means for modernizing Indonesia. I argue, however, that Washington failed to reconcile the conflict between its rhetorical commitment to modernizing Indonesia and its support for a corrupt, statist, authoritarian regime which in many ways posed the greatest obstacles to economic and political reform. This project contributes to the study of U.S.-Indonesian relations by highlighting the persistence of Washington's commitment to authoritarian modernization throughout the 1960s, a mutual commitment many Indonesians shared and which shaped the trajectory of Indonesian history for decades to come. It also engages broader discussions about the role of ideology in U.S. foreign policy and U.S. economic and political development policies during the Cold War. |
