| Many scholars have made various efforts to describe and explain the causes of states' decisions to either acquire nuclear weapons or refrain from doing so. The prevailing explanation among them is simple: if states face external threats, they are more likely to acquire nuclear weapons, and if the existing threats disappear, states are less likely to do so. This logic does not, however, seem to provide satisfactory explanations for the overall dynamics of potential proliferators' reversal from proliferation to forbearance, because the nuclear choices of states are foreign polices as well as domestic policies. Therefore, this study explores possible causal nexuses between dynamics in states' nuclear reversal and factor changes at the international and domestic levels.; The main tasks of this single case study are: (1) to inquire into the major determinants of states' nuclear choices within a theoretical perspective; (2) to apply those determinants comparatively to the case of South Korea in two different periods of 1961--1979 and 1980--1994; and (3) to explain the case and draw theoretical lessons as well as policy recommendations.; One of the most important findings in this study is that while South Korea's aspirations to acquire nuclear weapons can be sufficiently explained by international factors, its decisions not to acquire them can be better accounted for by domestic factors. Further, this study demonstrates that both external and internal factors combined can sufficiently account for the overall dynamics in the nuclear choices of South Korea. |
