| In this dissertation I approach the question of why certain groups prevail in their efforts to influence government policies by examining the politics of industrial reform in post-socialist Poland, where certain industries and firms were given much of what they asked for, while others were virtually ignored. I examine patterns of government-industry interaction and bargaining within firms in the Polish chemicals, coal, engineering, food processing, metallurgy, shipbuilding, and textiles sectors. My approach includes analysis of financial data from 530 individual companies, a series of focused company case studies, and a range of evidence from trade union bargaining sessions. I find that one key determinant of government favoritism was regional concentration of industry. I suggest that geographic proximity of firms facilitated organization and communication within sectoral trade union confederations, which enabled certain sectors to bargain more effectively with the central government. Sectors and firms that were able to obtain government favoritism in the initial years of reform spent much of their time and energy attempting (often successfully) to retain ongoing assistance rather than on developing proactive solutions to problems of restructuring. |
