| This study examines the driving forces and conditions under which China has chosen to join and abide by the rule-based, multilateral nuclear non-proliferation regime centered on the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT). It analyses China's declaratory policy and participatory/compliant behavior toward the regime during three stages (1949–1976, 1977–1989, and in the 1990s). Beijing's policies and behavior in negotiating the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) and dealing with the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR) are analyzed as well, in order to provide two distinctive comparisons.; This study employs a modified “rational choice” approach combined with normative perspectives. Synthesizing different theoretical approaches with multiple variables at multiple levels of analysis, the proposed analytical framework consists of two interactive independent variables—the Chinese leadership's cost-benefit calculations of its national interests and the relevant international regime's normative power—coupled with two respective intervening variables, the characteristics of China's policy making/coordinating process and the effectiveness of the international regime's leadership. Testing the three cases against this framework, the following major findings and conclusions are made:; While uneven, China's overall declaratory policy and participatory/compliant behavior toward the nuclear non-proliferation regime have been moving through stages in a more positive direction. The current stage has witnessed a firmer commitment, a more complete integration into the regime, an initiative to establish a more comprehensive and rigorous nuclear export control mechanism, and a reduced number of breaches of regime norms.; Conditioned by the fundamental orientation of China's domestic and external policies, along with the evolving global system and international environment, China's non-proliferation policy and behavior, nuclear in particular, are influenced by a dynamic, interactive process between the nation and the regime.; Most importantly, influenced by Beijing's cost-benefit calculations of its national interests, including economic interests, national security and geopolitical concerns, and the Taiwan issue, China responds to a specific non-proliferation norm/regime to the degree that it has taken root firmly and universally.; In addition, China's non-proliferation policy and behavior are impacted by the status of its policy making and coordinating process and by the leadership (or lack of leadership) of the “key actor(s)” in a non-proliferation regime. |
