| This study addresses the mechanism of recurring patterns of noncooperative inter-Korean relations from a game-theoretic point of view. It focuses on the strategic aspect of inter-Korean relations. To account for the various aspects of noncooperation between the two Koreas, four different issue areas--political, military, nuclear, and economic--are examined with the aid of game models. In the game models, changes in both internal and international settings are incorporated in terms of changes in the utility function of each player, hence, payoffs of the outcomes, and the shadow of future of the games.;The general conclusion of this study is that the end of the Cold War would increase the likelihood of cooperation between the two Koreas. This study shows that global detente will change inter-Korean relations from a Prisoner's Dilemma situation to a Stag Hunt situation, and that more democratization in South Korea and economic and political stability in North Korea will enlarge the shadow of the future and change the structure of payoffs so as to induce cooperation. On the other hand, the bargaining model shows that the enlarged negotiation set by a favorable international setting does not guarantee an increase in autonomous cooperation if either player has a precommitment. While some of these findings confirm our intuitive beliefs, others are counter-intuitive. |
