War powers, democracy and American foreign policy

Past literature on war powers in American foreign policy has found that since the Second World War, Congress defers to the President when the commander in chief introduces U.S. troops abroad. Congress avoids taking a decision-making role prior to the introduction of troops abroad and presidents have traditionally used autonomous political and constitutional arguments to justify their military endeavors.; With the arrival of a new Republican majority in the United States' Congress in 1995, a potential for fundamental change in the war powers relationship existed. President Clinton was faced with a seemingly aggressive legislative branch, especially in the areas of foreign policy making and U.S. deployments authorized by the United Nations. President Clinton also appeared willing to listen to congressional demands for a substantive role in deployment decisions.; In addressing the interplay between Congress and the President over war powers in the first Clinton administration, three case studies of the United States' major military deployments from 1993 to 1996 were conducted. Three chapters address the United States' deployments to Somalia, Haiti and Bosnia. The United States' bombings of Iraq in 1993 and 1996 are also examined. This dissertation finds that Congress continued to defer to the President during Clinton's first term as President in light of an ostensibly activist 104th Congress. However, the dissertation also shows that in the American deployment to Bosnia, the President's rhetoric vis-a-vis Congress underwent substantial change compared to the language used by President George Bush.; The dissertation also examines the role of partisanship and its impact on war powers, and Congressional views on U.S. participation in U.N. peace-enforcement operations. The study concludes with a discussion of the policy implications of a Congress that acquiesces to a President who can use force abroad unilaterally.