The road to the post-Yalta system: China's challenge to the United States in the New World Order, 1945-1949

Base on recently released archival materials in China, this dissertation will argue that the Chinese Communist revolution upset the balance in East Asia envisioned at the Yalta Conference and fundamentally altered the international environment.; Before the end of World War II, the United States and Soviet Union made efforts to maintain a cooperative and peaceful relationship, creating the "Yalta system." The United States visualized China as a unified and democratic local power to replace Japan as a regional peace keeper while the Soviet Union attempted to create a buffer zone in Manchuria.; China faced political and military turmoil as the Guomindang (GMD) and the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) struggled to dominate the country. The great powers initially decided to work through Chiang Kai-shek's GMD government to reach their goals. Chiang aligned the GMD with the power system established at Yalta to subjugate his rival without resorting to military means. Mao Zedong and the CCP, however, maneuvered to upset the system. The experiences with the Yalta system convinced Mao in mid-1946 that he did not have to follow the rules of the powers in East Asia. As the "two camps" took shape in Europe, Mao developed a new theory for conducting revolution in China, the "intermediate zone theory."; The CCP victory resulted in a new structure in East Asia with a subtle interaction among the CCP and the great powers affecting the final alignment of the CCP and the subsequent emerging of the new structure in East Asia. Mao calculated that the U.S.S.R. would help consolidate his leadership, provide substantial funding for reconstruction and national security, and lay the ground work for national ideological integrity. Thus, Mao declared his three principles in foreign relations: initiate a new oven; clean the house first and then invite guests; lean to one side (favor the U.S.S.R.). The "lean to one side" policy of the CCP ended the existence of an ambiguous buffer between the great power and the intermediate zone no longer existed in East Asia. A new structure in East Asia finally emerged.