'The yardstick of trade': The Far Eastern Division and American-East Asian relations, 1933--1935 (China, Japan, Maxwell Hamilton, Stanley Hornbeck)

Historians have argued that the United States was timid in its relations with Japan during the first Franklin Roosevelt administration because of security concerns. This dissertation shows that although officials feared war until at least June 1933, American policy subsequently was determined more by trade than by security concerns. The State Department measured its policy choices toward China and Japan by what Assistant Chief of the Far Eastern Division Maxwell Hamilton called “the yardstick of trade.” He coined this phrase after touring East Asia during 1933–1934. This important trip and the resulting reports he wrote on conditions in Asia have been heretofore neglected by historians.; American-East Asian relations lay under the guiding hand of the Far Eastern Division and its chief, Stanley Hornbeck, and were dictated by commercial concerns considered vital during the Great Depression. Keeping relations balanced between Japan and China was the primary goal of the State Department. A more aggressive condemnation of Japanese actions might have boosted exports to China, but only at the expense of trade with Japan, which was twice as valuable. Recognizing Japan's puppet state of Manchukuo, however, contravened former Secretary of State Henry Stimson's non-recognition doctrine. Recognizing Manchukuo could also have led to trouble with investments in or exports to China, where over ten thousand businessmen and missionaries plied their respective vocations. Any hint that U.S. diplomats would condone the abrogation of international obligations—such as the Kellogg-Briand and Nine-Power Treaties—might have led China to renew its calls for the end to the unequal treaty system. It also might have led to violent anti-American agitation, a threat to both current, and more importantly, potential increased trade with China's teeming millions in the future.; The Far Eastern Division quietly pursued the continuation of the non-recognition doctrine and opposition to Japan's aggression. America's even-handed strategy did not satisfy either Asian state. Yet the United States avoided alienating their peoples and governments, thereby protecting current and expanding future commerce with Japan and China—its number three and eight trading partners, respectively, absorbing thirteen percent of American exports.