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Technology policy in the global economy

Posted on:1998-03-27Degree:Ph.DType:Dissertation
University:University of Hawai'i at ManoaCandidate:Tabatchnaia-Tamirisa, Natalia EFull Text:PDF
GTID:1469390014474692Subject:Economics
Abstract/Summary:
Rapid technological advancement and economic globalization present new challenges to policy-makers in industrialized and developing countries alike. This three-essay dissertation examines economic aspects of technology policy, focusing on strategic regulation of trade in sensitive commodities and protection of intellectual property rights in an open economy.; Imperfectly competitive trade in commodities with both military and civilian applications, a.k.a. dual-use commodities, is modeled in the first essay. It analyzes the role of export taxes and civilian production subsidies in encouraging peaceful rather than military application of dual-use commodities in importing countries. Production subsidies are found to be Pareto-superior to export taxes and optimal under both Cournot and Bertrand modes of competition. When governments conjecture the profit-shifting effects of their policies, the Nash equilibrium combines export taxes and production subsidies.; The second essay considers intellectual property rights (IPRs) in the context of catching-up in a two-region endogenous growth model with product innovation and imitation. Weak IPR protection and a high imitation rate allow the initially knowledge-scarce imitator region to close the knowledge gap and switch to innovation, at which time emanates an incentive for tighter IPRs. Policy implications of international IPR harmonization are assessed in light of the theoretical results.; Finally, the third essay examines IPR protection in an endogenous growth model of a small open economy and quantifies the economic effects of tighter patent protection of pharmaceuticals under the Uruguay Round of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade in a computable general equilibrium model for India. With monopolistic competition in the imitating pharmaceutical industry, stronger patent protection leads to higher imitation costs and prices, and reduces variety, output and exports of pharmaceuticals, causing general equilibrium repercussions in other markets.
Keywords/Search Tags:Policy
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