Toulmin's informal logic as a bridge between political theory and policy analysis

In this essay I will advance the argument that an adaptation of the informal logic of S. E. Toulmin provides a superior means of analyzing the normative, empirical, and political components of public policy arguments within the tradition of liberal-democratic political theory. Political theorists, especially those which draw upon the 'good reasons' school in ethics, have made some progress toward the analysis of policy arguments. However their work has serious limitations, especially with regard to the use of empirical research. Theorists in the field of policy analysis have suggested means of integrating analysis of normative questions into their studies. The primary limitation of these methods is that they tend to undermine the institution-critical nature of normative theory. By extending Toulmin's logic of argumentation through enabling it to handle the complexity of policy arguments, and by applying it to the specific characteristics of policy arguments, a more suitable method can be devised. I contend that the analysis of policy arguments through the approach initiated by Toulmin can establish a new type of epistemology for political research that bridges much of the gap between the concerns of political theorists and policy analysts. I employ an extended illustrative example to support my position, taken from Mead's essay on welfare policy: Beyond Entitlement (1986). Continued development of a methodology for the analysis of policy arguments could establish the feasibility of a pragmatic paradigm for the conduct of normative political theory.