| This study employs a decision-making framework for analyzing the modern automotive bureaucracy in the People's Republic of China. It traces the history of China's vehicle industrial development, and examines four cases of foreign-invested passenger car projects. Based on this empirical data, the study makes predictions of future automotive progress in China.;Decision-making in China tended to be hierarchical and centralized in the national government from 1949 until the death of Mao Zedong in 1976. Reforms begun under Deng Xiaoping diffused political power, enhancing the role of local governments in the policy process. China's opening to the West allowed foreign entrepreneurs to further affect policy, and economic reforms made domestic economic factors more pertinent. The study's theoretical framework takes into account all of these elements in the policy process.;The case study data indicate Chinese actions in developing an automotive strategy show some tentative progress toward rationality. Introduction of American Motors (Chrysler), Volkswagen, Peugeot, and the short-lived Panda Motors projects essentially cut China's dependence on Japanese imported vehicles. Though China benefited from technology transfer, however, by early 1992 the country remained incapable of exporting vehicles. The founding of additional ventures in the early 1990s threatened to leave a glut of domestic supply, and indicated the diffusion of central control over the nation's automotive industrial development could lead to future inefficient production.;Policy-making in the automotive sector, then, remained fragmented, as central, local, and foreign actors moved to advance their own agendas. Were policy over other industrial areas to develop in such a way, China's economic modernization drive would be adversely affected in the coming decade. |
