| This dissertation analyzes international bureaus from the principal-agent and public choice perspective. These bureaus include the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, the International Monetary Fund and the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade.;The literature on the economic theories of bureaucracy is surveyed, a new perspective is suggested in its application to the international bureaus. This new perspective emphasizes the understanding of the formal and the informal structure of the bureau, as a precondition for determining the relationship between agents and principals. A key element in this relationship is the bureau budget because bureau budget has implications for bureau staff procurement and related expenditures. We model bureau per capita based on the principal-agent and the public choice paradigm. There are two sets of empirical findings. The first deals with the relationship between bureau budgets per capita and its determinants as well as its implication for interaction between bureaus. The second examines the determinants of budget per capita in selected international bureaus and the implications for the impact of the Reagan administration and United States changing policy. |
