BEAR IN THE LAND OF MORNING CALM: SOVIET POLICY TOWARD NORTH KOREA, 1964-1968

This study examines Soviet strategy toward North Korea and the Korean peninsula from 1964 to 1968. Its methodology involves the analysis of four sets of distinct but related rivalries: the US versus the Soviet Union and China; the USSR versus the PRC; South Korea versus North Korea; and the US versus North Vietnam. The nature and evolution of these sets of rivalries provide the framework for analyzing Soviet and North Korean strategic policies.;This study encompasses four theses. First, Moscow's policy toward North Korea was a function of its broader Asian strategy aimed at recreating Soviet-Chinese cooperation, or, at a minimum, preventing US-Chinese collaboration. One important Soviet tactic was to increase external military threats to China in the hope that they--if properly manipulated--would not only exacerbate US-Chinese antagonisms, but also pressure Peking toward a rapproachement with the USSR. During the period in question, the Soviets sought close cooperation with the North Koreans and attempted to increase tensions in Korea. By supporting Kim Il-song's policy of guerrilla attacks against the South, Moscow hoped to increase American pressure upon China and to limit US-South Korean military cooperation in Vietnam.;Secondly, Pyongyang found solid grounds for cooperation with Moscow and shared a common strategic interest with it. Restoration of the Sino-Soviet alliance would have bolstered North Korean military and economic strength through closer cooperation with the two communist powers. In the short term, Pyongyang favored destabilizing South Korea to frustrate its rapidly growing strategic potential and to terminate its military involvement in Vietnam.;Thirdly, in the Sino-Soviet competition for influence in North Korea, the Soviet Union retained a dominant position due to China's inability to meet the economic, military, and technological needs of North Korea. Soviet support for and cooperation with Pyongyang had a significant impact upon Kim Il-song's policy.;The second half of the 1960's was a turbulent time in Asia. The Vietnam conflict, the aggravation of Sino-Soviet relations, the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution in China, and the increase of Pyongyang's belligerent activities against the South--all increased the role of Korea in Soviet Asian strategy. Fundamental questions to be answered in this study include: What was Soviet Asian strategy? What was the role of North Korea in that strategy? How did the war in Vietnam affect the fortunes of Korea?;Fourthly, Chinese strategy toward Korea aimed at preventing close Soviet-North Korean cooperation and maintaining stability on the Korean peninsula. Close cooperation between Moscow and Pyongyang would have threatened Chinese security in the Manchurian region. And any destabilization in Korea would only have increased American military power in the Far East, which would in turn have exacerbated the risk of a Sino-American military confrontation. This explains in large part the increase of Chinese pressure upon the North Korean regime during the period under discussion.;This dissertation is based primarily on close examination of Soviet, Chinese, North Korean, and American official sources, although the author also conducted interviews with selected officials in Washington, D.C. and Seoul.