The Differential Effects of Threat Perception: Variations in State Responses to Nuclear Proliferation

Contemporary fears of rogue state nuclear proliferation and nuclear terrorism pose unique challenges for the global community. North Korea continues nuclear testing and ballistic missile launches, the Pakistan-India rivalry has teetered on the brink of nuclear war, and Iran challenges the provisions of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty by enriching uranium beyond levels required for civilian use. Additionally, terrorist organizations such as al Qaeda have stated their desire to acquire a nuclear weapon. Adding to this conundrum is the international black market of nuclear technology and material marketed by the A.Q. Khan Network. In the face of these challenges, the United States and Israel are the most vocal opponents of further Middle East proliferation. Even so, historically they have responded differently to the same proliferation cases. In the past thirty years, three Middle Eastern states reached significant milestones towards acquiring a nuclear weapon. In three of the four cases---Iraq 1981, Iraq 2003 and Syria 2007---either the United States or Israel bombed the country suspected of proliferation, while the other has either taken no action or used coercive diplomacy as a proliferation policy. In the fourth case of Iran 2011, the United States is pursuing coercive diplomacy while Israel is threatening military action to halt Iran's uranium enrichment. The current proliferation literature does not adequately account for these variations in powerful state responses.;This study seeks to fill this gap in the literature by examining why states that have the capability to severely damage a proliferating state's nuclear program instead choose to pursue coercive diplomacy. Alternatively, they take no action whatsoever or use military force. This study examines the United States and Israel's responses to the four most advanced cases of proliferation by Middle Eastern states---Iraq 1981, Iraq 2003, Syria 2007 and Iran 2011---to determine whether and how their differing situations influenced their threat perceptions and responses to proliferation. The dissertation argues that state-level analysis is most effective in determining the variations in individual state perceptions and proliferation responses. Consequently, the dissertation argues that cognitive psychological influences, national security policies and military capabilities are the causal mechanisms that influence variations in threat perceptions and the subsequent response to nuclear proliferation.