Politics of issue linkage and delinkage: An analysis of Japanese-Soviet negotiations

This is a study of issue linkages and delinkages in Japanese-Soviet negotiations. Issue linkage is defined as a negotiating strategy in which unrelated or only loosely related issues are raised and tied into the central issue of negotiation with a view to extracting gains or preventing the other negotiating party from gaining advantages in the main issue. Issue delinkage refers to the conscious separation of issues which are either closely related to each other or linked deliberately. A framework of analysis is constructed, using several variables (relative negotiating strength in both the main and the linked issues, the nature of negotiation, overall power equation, domestic and external factors). This is followed by three detailed case studies of direct negotiations between Japan and the Soviet Union. These involve the negotiations for the normalization of diplomatic relations in 1955-1956 (the Soviet fishery-political linkage, among others), the summit negotiations of 1973 (the Japanese territorial-economic linkage), and the fisheries negotiations of 1977 (the Soviet fishery-territorial linkage and Japanese delinkage attempts). The findings of issue linkages and delinkages are compared and analyzed on the basis of the framework of analysis and several conclusions are drawn. While the asymmetry of interests and of negotiating strength in multiple issue areas creates circumstances congenial to deliberate issue linkage and delinkage, there exist different mechanisms of behavior between inter- and intra-issue linkages. Issue linkage and delinkage can be both constructive and destructive, and they can be the negotiating techniques of either the strong or the weak. Congruence in the perception of mutually acceptable conditions, even if the end result may not equally benefit the negotiating parties, is an essential condition for succcessful issue linkage and delinkage. At the same time, issue linkage and delinkage can be constrained by the existence of non-negotiability of issues, overall power equation, domestic and external factors. There may, in addition, be built-in historical and structural elements of linkage and delinkage unique to each bilateral negotiation. The main focus of the study is on the Japanese side. Several new facts on Soviet negotiating behavior are also presented.