British and German economic relations with Japan, 1970-1990: A study of economic self-interest and cooperation in bilateral relationships between middle powers

This dissertation explores the following questions: "Can a cooperative pattern of international relations develop among middle powers? If so, what motivates middle powers to cooperate?" Existing scholarship has responded to these questions with positive answers that are not mutually exclusive. International cooperation can be achieved through the dynamic interplay of a set of elements in international relations, the presence of a hegemon, and the existence of international regimes. These three alternative paths--as presented in the international politics literature--have in different ways contributed to the building of theories of international cooperation; however, all three define international cooperation as a function of elements which are "external" to nations. This dissertation addresses the question of whether international cooperation is also a function of an element "internal" to nations--namely, their "economic self-interest.".;This dissertation argues that "economic self-interest" is a more viable alternative path to cooperation, not only for its flexibility and suitability to nations, but more importantly for its potential to explain a nation's propensity toward cooperative behavior, independent of "external" factors. It accomplishes this task through the analysis of two bilateral relationships among middle powers. Both cases feature Japan as one of the middle powers. The first case is an analysis of Great Britain's economic relations with Japan and the second case is an analysis of Germany's economic relations with Japan. Both relationships are examined over a period of twenty years--from 1970 to 1990.;The present study shows that economic self-interest creates incentives for nations to intensify interaction with one another in a cooperative, conflict-free mode despite heightened economic competition among them. This study reveals three major findings. First, bilateral relations intensify when one of the countries is a strong economic competitor which actively promotes interaction with the other middle power in order to exercise its own autonomy. Second, such activism by the strong competitor is met by the other side not in a conflictual manner--as often argued in theories of international relations--rather in a conduct I call "managing competition." Third, "managed competition" does, in turn, open doors to "cooperation" among middle powers.