| With the rapid economic and social development,the continuous advancement of the industrialization process,China's new urbanization construction has achieved remarkable results.People's living standards have been continuously improved,and their lifestyles have also undergone tremendous changes.At the same time,many environmental problems have also arisen.The amount of energy consumption has surged in the form of geometric progression,ranking first in the world.With the improvement of residents' purchasing power,the energy consumption structure has also changed.In the past,environmental pollution was mentioned mainly referring to industrial pollution caused by industrial production.However,the forms of environmental pollution are becoming increasingly diversified and have become industrial compound pollution composed of pollution,motor vehicle exhaust pollution and daily life pollution of residents.Since the winter of 2012,the frequent haze pollution throughout the country has not only greatly reduced the visibility of the air,but also carried a large number of bacteria and viruses,which greatly affected people's health,which has become a close concern of the government and the public hot issues.China is the "severe disaster area" of global haze pollution.The control of haze pollution is an urgent task at present,and the complex and spatial overflow characteristics of haze pollution have increased the difficulty of governance to a certain extent.This makes the treatment of haze pollution a complicated and long process,requiring the joint efforts of various levels of government,society,and the public.This article first studies the spatial correlation of haze pollution,which is a prerequisite for the analysis of cross-domain coordinated governance of haze pollution in the following.Only by fully realizing the spatial spillover and relevance of haze pollution in neighboring areas can the diverse subjects have incentives for cross-domain cooperation.Secondly,on the premise of fully cognizing the non-linear spatial correlation and dynamic evolution characteristics of haze pollution,a spatial Durbin model was established to empirically study the influencing factors of haze pollution.Under the current situation that the central government attaches great importance to the control of haze pollution,the focus is how much impact does the local government's environmental regulation policies have on the local haze pollution control? Will the environmental regulation policy in a certain place affect the haze pollution control in neighboring areas? What are the main influencing factors of haze pollution? Finally,based on multi-agent research on haze pollution control issues,using game methods to study the game behavior of neighboring regional governments in the process of haze control,and analyze its evolution process and results.Study the behavioral strategy choices and influencing factors of the two main bodies of local government and pollutant enterprises,so as to improve the enthusiasm of pollutant enterprises in the process of haze management.Furthermore,the research objects are extended to the three main bodies of local government,enterprises and the public,and further study the collaborativebenefits and payment cost of the three bounded rational subjects participating in the collaborativemanagement of haze pollution,with a view to provide good suggestions on better collaborative governance of haze pollution.The main research content and conclusions of this article are as follows:First,the theoretical analysis framework of China's haze pollution collaborative governance mechanism is proposed.First of all,the literature and related theories of haze pollution research are explained.It is pointed out that due to the characteristics of high regionality and high mobility of haze pollution,it is more difficult to control the haze pollution.It is necessary to break the original institutional arrangement of administrative divisions and reshape it.Benefits structure,effectively promote the cooperation and control of haze pollution among local governments;At the same time,the public and external characteristics of haze pollution itself,and its governance involves the interests of multiple subjects such as the government,enterprises,and the public.Therefore,in order to effectively improve the collaborative governance effect of haze pollution,based on cross-domain governance and collaborative governance perspective,this paper proposes a mesh governance model of transverse cross-regional collaboration and vertical stakeholders,from lateral and vertical two aspects.To study the collaborative governance of haze pollution,the theoretical analysis framework of this paper was formed.Second,analyze the spatial characteristics of haze pollution in China.First,a descriptive statistical analysis of the basic situation of China's haze pollution is carried out,and it is pointed out that China's haze pollution as a whole shows significant spatial differentiation characteristics.The current situation of haze pollution will be analyzed with emphasis.Then,using exploratory spatial data analysis methods,a spatial adjacency matrix,an inverse distance matrix,and an economic distance weight matrix were created,and the spatial correlation of haze pollution in different regions of China was statistically tested.According to the analysis results of the global Moran index,the local Moran index,and the Moran scatter plot,the spatial distribution and spatial agglomeration characteristics of haze pollution in China are analyzed and discussed.From a global perspective,whether it is a spatial adjacency matrix(0-1matrix),an inverse distance matrix,or an economic distance weight matrix,the global Moran index of haze pollution has passed the 1% significance level test,which fully illustrates China's haze pollution has significant spatial spillover effects.From a local perspective,more than 80% of China's provinces and cities are in the first and third quadrants of the Moran scatter plot,indicating that most regions are spatially positively correlated,and only a small percentage of provinces are in the second and fourth quadrants.Shanxi,Shaanxi,Hunan and other provinces has more changes,and most other provinces have little changes.This further shows that the haze concentration in various provinces and cities across the country also has obvious spatial spillover effects,and it is stable in the long run.Third,analyze of factors affecting China's haze pollution.This paper uses the data of 31 provinces,municipalities and autonomous regions in China from 2000 to2017 to establish a spatial econometric model to conduct a full sample,regional heterogeneity,and temporal heterogeneity analysis of the influencing factors of haze pollution in China.In the sub-sample analysis,the regional heterogeneity grouping was carried out according to the eastern,central,and western regions of China,and the time heterogeneity grouping was carried out in 2000-2012 and 2013-2017.From a national perspective,the environmental regulation coefficient is significantly negative.The higher the level of environmental regulation,the suppression effect on haze pollution is better.However,although the spatial lag of environmental regulations is also negative,it is not significant,and the effect can be ignored.This shows that the spatial spillover effect of environmental regulations has not played a role,and the strengthening of environmental regulations by local governments has not played a good role in suppressing haze pollution in surrounding areas.From the perspective of economic development,there is a significant U-shaped relationship between per capita GDP and haze pollution.Environmental Kuznets curve has not yet appeared in our country.The proportion of the tertiary industry has increased,and the level of haze pollution has not been significantly reduced;the increase in population density,the increase in the level of urbanization,and the investment in transportation infrastructure aimed at increasing the length of roads will all bring haze pollution problems.The increase in the level of opening to the outside world does not necessarily increase the level of haze pollution.In terms of time,from 2000 to 2012,the impact of environmental regulations was more significant,effectively suppressing haze pollution.However,from 2013 to 2017,the impact of environmental regulations was not significant,but the degree of haze pollution was greatly reduced.From a regional perspective,the eastern region has the highest level of environmental regulation,followed by the central region,and the western region is the weakest.The environmental regulation has a significant inhibitory effect on the eastern and central regions,and has shown an insignificant positive promotion effect on the western region.Fourth,research on the cross-domain collaborative governance game of haze pollution control among local governments.Based on the cross-domain joint treatment of haze pollution,using the differential game method,according to the different situations in the area of haze pollution control,three scenarios are proposed.Respectively,the occurrence of a haze pollution incident in a certain place in the area,which only affects the political cost of the government of the place where the haze occurred,and has no effect on the government of another place;The occurrence of a haze pollution incident in a certain area not only affects the political cost of the government where the haze occurs,but also brings political cost losses to the government of another place;introduce the supervision and evaluation mechanism and punishment mechanism,establish the differential game model respectively,and compare and analyze the two.It is found that the efforts of various local governments in haze pollution governance are negatively related to the governance costs they pay;By comparing the first situation with the second situation,it is found that in the second case,the efforts of the subjects in the prevention of haze are less than those in the first case,which means that there is a "free rider" phenomenon in the process of coordinating haze control.By comparing the second case and the third case,it is found that in the third situation,the efforts of the subjects in the prevention of haze are greater than the efforts of the subjects in the prevention of haze in the second situation,which means that the introduction of a supervision mechanism and an assessment mechanism can increase the enthusiasm of the main body of haze control and provide collaborativebenefits for haze control.Fifth,the evolutionary game research on the collaborative governance of haze pollution between local governments and enterprises.Based on the realistic background of "the enterprise's pursuit of economic profit maximization,the poor subjective initiative of actively managing the haze,and excessive reliance on government power",the game between the local government and the pollutant emission company is analyzed,and the result is that the haze pollution in the process of governance,the long-term evolutionary and stable strategy of the two main bodies of local government and pollutant companies will be affected by the relationship between corporate governance costs and collaborativebenefits,and the relationship between local government collaborativebenefits and punishment.Sixth,the evolutionary game study of collaborativemanagement of haze pollution by local governments,enterprises and the public.Through different strategies and actions taken by local governments,enterprises,and the public based on bounded rationality in the treatment of haze pollution,a game model of the three-party co-governance is constructed,and the strategies of different actors in the long-term repeated game are analyzed,and finally form an ideal strategy(active public participation,corporate emission reduction standards,and strict supervision by local governments).By analyzing the equilibrium stability of single-species pure strategy and mixed strategy,the following conclusions are drawn: The equilibrium stability of a single-species pure strategy is not only related to the factors that affect each agent's own strategy,but also is affected by the strategy choices of other agents;In the haze pollution control scenario of the tripartite governance,regardless of whether the local government initially supervises,whether the company meets the emission reduction standard,as long as the public is willing to actively participate in the governance action,at this time the three parties will all participate in the haze pollution control action,and then the environment governance will be significantly improved and enter a stable and virtuous cycle;Conversely,when the system is in a bad situation,if there is no active guidance or support from the local government,the enterprise or the public will not have the motivation to participate in the haze pollution control,so the system will be in a vicious circle,and eventually the haze pollution control will fall into " the tragedy of the commons".In the scenario where tripartite entities participate in haze pollution control with a certain probability,by analyzing the sensitivity of the decision-making parameters that affect each entity,we find that when companies and local governments make strategic choices,their action directions are consistent.The government and enterprises unite to effectively guide the public,protect the vital interests of the public to participate in the treatment of haze pollution,and encourage the public to exercise third-party supervision rights,which can finally form a good state of tripartite governance.There are 17 figures,32 tables and 242 references in the paper. |
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