Reseach Of Power Plant's Momopoly Behavior And Regulation Bidding Mechanism Considering Network Loss

Since the 1990s, many countries have been at a crucial period in power market reform. With the changes of monopoly system of power industry, corresponding changes happened to the way of the electric regulation. In the process of power market reform, the key problem for the electric supervisor is how to design an available power-price mechanism to weaken the market power of power suppliers. Now the Chinese generation reform lies in marketization proceeding, in which monopoly & competition and market & Authority power exist complexly in some time, equilibrium generation market structure will be formed. As far as market player, Generation Company's market behavior is to choose own bidding strategy, which affects the generation market structure. Otherwise, it is important to study Generation Company's bidding strategy when we analyze generation market structure, and probe into the policy efficiency based on the interaction effect between generation market structure and Generation Company's market behavior, which makes some reference in power market practice and put forward some new idea on power reform.The research approach of the paper is: Firstly, the author summarizes the actuality of domestic and international electricity market's reform and research literature, which is the foundation of this dissertation. The analysis illustrates Chinese power market lies in a low-grade phase, in which competition generation market is expected. The research lacks of model of market structure and multi-unit bidding in a good many research of power market in existing literature. After the research status and design theory of the price mechanism were reviewed, some important factors which influence market power behavior of power suppliers were discovered. Through simulated the process which power supplier monopolize market, the factors about natural monopoly and mechanism which influents the market power was analysis, and finding signal transduction is a key factor affect action of power suppler. And then, current power-price mechanism were reviewed again from signal transduction and found that the more interference degree of the signal transduction, the more weaken of the market power of the power suppliers. The interference degree of signal transduction in mechanism belongs to the category of bounded rationality theory. In order to better define the concept of signal transduction mechanism, the paper summarized and analyzed the methods of the bounded rationality modeling method, finding Moore automata is hard to resolve the problem of incomplete information and several participants in game. Therefore, the bounded rationality modeling method based on the Mealy automata was proposed, an economic simulative frame based on Mealy automata was build. In order to dispute conspiracy signal among power suppliers, a quasi-randomized matching power-price mechanism of power suppliers was proposed and simulated in the new frame. The experiment result expressed that the quasi-randomized matching power-price mechanism of power suppliers could reduce the market power of the power supplier and proved it is feasible to design the power-price mechanism from the interference degree of signal transduction.The main features and innovations are as follow:?With the theory of contestable and workable competition, the dissertation set up the oligarch & workable generation electricity market paradigm based on the analyses of generation industrial traditional economic characteristic, in which scale economic of generation company and workable competition of market are feasible. Author considers trade permission between networks is very important for the market paradigm if inter linkage exists.?An extension of the bounded rationality modeling theory based on bounded automata to available to achieve the multi-person bounded rationality gambling behavior modeling was perform. Under this theory of modeling instruction, the paper has carried on the modeling to the electric-power produces'behavior. Power supplier's decision-making was described by the bounded automata which can better express the complexity of decision-making. The more complex of decision-making, the more difficult to achieve conspire among electric-power producers. The research result provides the theory basis to design the electric- price mechanism for restraining the market power of power supplier.?A incentive power-price mechanism of the coordinate with the electric-power production and environmental protection based on the signal transmission was proposed. The mechanism interfere the collusive signals of power suppliers from two aspects. On the one hand, quasi-random matching methods make the power suppliers hard to get others'prices and predict the market balanced price, and increase collusive difficulty among power suppliers. On the other hand, the concept of unit emission reduction was introduced in the electric market so that the differentiated of electric-products existed. According to unit emission reduction, the power market was divided into two submarkets. Government could take the different stimulated methods in two submarkets. This way further interference signal transmission among power suppliers so as to restrain market power of power suppliers, while stimulate generators to reduce emissions. Using bounded rationality modeling method based on Mealy automaton in this paper, discovered that the decision model's complexity of the power suppliers was increased. So, it was suggested that the difficult of conspiracy among power suppliers was increased, namely, their market power is restrained. Through the simulation experimental, it is proved that this mechanism is validity to coordinate electric-power produce and environment protection.