Nev Supply Chain Optimal Decision Based On The Newsvendor Model Under The CVaR Criterion

Newsvendor models under incomplete rationality have indicated that risk aversion and loss aversion are two important factors leading to the ordering/production decision bias.However,most of previous studies consider risk aversion or loss aversion independently while the combined effect of these two factors is not clear.This dissertation addresses such a gap by incoprating risk aversion and loss aversion meanwhile under the CVa R(Conditional Value-at-Risk)criterion to explore the interaction between them.In the risk-averse & loss-averse newsvendor model,it is shown that the optimal order quantity and the maximum risky performance are both reduced by risk aversion and loss aversion.Moreover,the negative effects of the two factors can be offset under the certain provided conditions.On the other hand,as the important measure to cope with environmental deterioration and energy challenge as well as promote the reform and transformation of the automotive industry,NEVs(New Energy Vehicles)are paid much attention to by our government.With the marketization process of NEVs,consumers' diversified demands are increasing and the relevant government policies are constantly adjusted,which results in the high NEV demand uncertainty.Facing the high risk,the NEV retailer and manufacturer tend to be risk-averse rather than risk-neutral when making the odering/production decision.Based on the risk-averse newsvendor model under the CVa R criterion,this dissertation,combining the mathematical modeling and numerical analysis methods,involves the effects of the retailer's sales effort,players' risk attitudes and government subsidy to investigate the coordination and negotiation mechanisms in the NEV single-channel(traditional retail channel)and dual-channel(traditional retail channel + drop shipping channel)supply chain where both the retailer and the manufacturer are risk-averse.The main contributions of this dissertation can be summarized as follows.In the NEV traditional retail channel,the SS-WP contract(Subsidy-Sharing-Based Wholesale Price Contract)is proved not able to achieve coordination and this dissertation proposes a SS-SRP contract(Subsidy-Sharing-Based Sales Rebate/Penalty Contract)with appropriate parameters to coordinate the channel.It is demonstrated that a well-designed SS-SRP contract can promote NEV sales and lead to a Pareto-improving win-win situation for both the retailer and manufacturer compared to the non-coordination case.Comparisons of the effects of some significant parameters on the profit allocation under different contracts provide the necessary conditions for stably maintaining the NEV traditional retail channel under the SS-SRP coordination contract,including the certain scopes of sales target,government subsidy,retailer's risk aversion degree and demand fluctuation.In the NEV dual-channel supply chain,this dissertation proves that the SS-WP contract fails to coordinate the traditional retail channel or the drop shipping channel and that the SS-SRP contract can only coordinate the traditional retail channel while the CP contract(Commitment-Penalty Contract)can only coordinate the drop shipping channel.Thus a combined SS-SRP-CP contract is proposed to coordinate the NEV dual-channel supply chain.The efficiency evaluation reveals that a well-designed SS-SRP-CP contract can promote NEV sales in both channels and lead to a Pareto-improving win-win situation for the supply chain players compared to the non-coordination case.It is also illustrated that the manufacturer free rides the retailer's sales effort in the drop shipping channel and the manufacturer prefers the drop shipping channel.Comparisons of the effects of some significant parameters on the profit allocation in the two channels under different contracts provide the necessary conditions for stably maintaining the NEV dual-channel supply chain under the SS-SRP-CP coordination contract,including the certain scopes of sales target,e-tailer's initial profit,government subsidy,players' risk aversion degrees,demand fluctuation and demand proportions between two channels.In a two-echelon NEV supply chain consisting of a risk-averse manufactuer and a risk-averse retailer,based on an assumption that the two players negotiate with each other about the order quantity and the wholesale price,this dissertation derives the equilibrium solutions and the players' profit shares under the Stackelberg game and Nash-bargaining framework.It is found that under both negotiation mechanisms,a more risk-averse manufacturer or retailer tends to occupy a higher profit share and a higher government subsidy leads to a higher profit share for the manufacturer and a lower one for the retailer.A comparison between the two negotiation mechanisms indicates that more NEVs are ordered and a higher supply chain profit is generated under the Nash-bargaining framework than the Stackelberg game.Numerical experiments about the effects of players' risk attitudes,government subsidy and bargaining power under the two negotiation mechanisms further verify the superiority of the Nash-bargaining framework and provide a necessary condition about the bargaining power contrast between two players to stably maintain the NEV supply chain under the Nash-bargaining framework.This dissertation explores the effect of risk aversion on the loss-averse newsvendor's decision-making and then addresses the coordination and negotiation mechanisms in the NEV supply chain under the risk-averse environment.Based on the proof of that the proposed coordination contarct and negotiation mechanism are effective and feasible in promoting the NEV sales and enhancing each player's profit,the practical significance of this research is to offer some guiding principles for the win-win cooperation among the NEV supply chain players and a suggestion for the government to set the subsidy more appropriately,which may help to promote the sustainable development of NEV commerce.