Optimal Decision On The New Energy Vehicle Supply Chain Considering Internet Channel

With the growing dependence on fuel oil and with serious environmental pollution,development of the new energy vehicle(NEV)is an important way to cope with energy shortage and climate change.At present,most research on NEV focuses on the qualitative studies of policy formulation and consumer preference.However,the quantitative studies on NEV supply chain and optimization decision problem is under research.This thesis establishes optimal models of NEV considering internet channel to study the supply chain coordination in different modes and to analyze the impact of various factors on supply chain performance when the demand is influenced by effort level.This paper establishes the internet channel supply chain model of NEV considering both complete rationality and loss aversion.In the case of complete rationality,we study the centralized decision-making model and obtain the optimal solution and the conditions.We introduce a third party to open shop and drop shipping these two common models and establish mathematical models.We find that,due to the degree of effort required to pay the cost,only the optimal level of decision-making efforts could maximize the expected profits of the supply chain.At the same time,we propose two kinds of contracts,the feedback and penalty contract based on subsidy sharing and the minimum sales volume contract based on subsidy sharing and shortage punishment.We prove that these two new contracts can realize the supply chain coordination,and profits can be arbitrary allocated between manufacturer and retailer.This means that manufacturers have two ways of cooperation.Both of them can achieve the same effect as in centralized decision-making.In the case of loss aversion,two supply chain models are established.We put forward the feedback and penalty contract based on subsidy sharing and the minimum sales volume contract based on subsidy sharing and shortage punishment for a loss averse decision-maker,and obtain the condition that the optimal order quantity is equal to the centralized decision It is proved that the loss-sharing contract can achieve the supply chain coordination and the complete rational party needs to share more losses with the increase of the degree of loss aversion.The research of this paper extends the study on the NEV channel sales model,and has practical significance to its supply chain.By solving and proving the model,this thesis provides two different modes of cooperation for the internet channel,and the manufacturers can choose the best one according to the actual conditions.At the same time,the supply chain can operate better when government subsidies benefit both manufacturers and retailers.The risk sharing between the manufacturer and the retailer can improve the performance of the supply chain.