Research On Decision-making Analysis And Coordination Mechanism Of Anti-counterfeiting Investment In Supply Chain Products

With the globalization of trade and increasingly fierce market competition,enterprises are no longer confined to a single economy.Many enterprises outsource their activities or business to overseas countries or regions,resulting in a large number of fake products penetrating into almost all industries,economic markets and supply chains.Fake and counterfeiting products have become an important problem in the global economy.However,the current supply chain generally lacks sufficient transparency,and customers and buyers often lack reliable methods to verify and confirm the true value of the purchased products or services.Therefore,it is very important to study the anti-counterfeiting investment of supply chain products and improve the transparency,traceability and security of supply chain.Based on the theory of supply chain quality management and game theory,this paper considers the reliability of supply chain anti-counterfeiting system,and studies the optimal investment decision and coordination mechanism of supply chain upstream and downstream enterprises.Firstly,this paper analyzes the framework of supply chain anti-counterfeiting traceability system based on RFID.In order to achieve the information input,storage,identification,query and other functions,the anti-counterfeiting system set up by the application server layer,data management layer and client layer,involving information server(IS),authentication server(AS),the traceability server(PS)and recording server(RS),and finally to manufacturers,traders,retailers and consumers in the supply chain business process design.Secondly,studying the supply chain including individual brands and a single retailer,considering anti-counterfeiting system reliability problem,respectively in the supply chain non-cooperation,cooperation,and fully integrated circumstances,establish a Stackelberg game model,discussed the optimal investment decision under different conditions and seek reasonable income distribution on the supply chain members.The research shows that the anti-counterfeiting system of supply chain has the highest reliability under the condition of complete integration.The optimal anti-counterfeiting reliability increases with the penetration rate of fake products and decreases with the anti-counterfeiting investment coefficient.There is a threshold of fake goods penetration rate in the market for brand manufacturers to make anti-fake investment.The higher thefake goods penetration rate is,the stronger the willingness of brand manufacturers to make anti-fake investment is.Finally,aiming at processing the problems of insufficient investment and double marginalization in decentralized decision making of supply chain,the coordination mechanism of anti-counterfeiting investment decision of supply chain is put forward,and the cost sharing contract design of anti-counterfeiting system jointly invested by brand and seller is carried out.The results show that the cost-sharing contract of wholesale price under decentralized decision-making can achieve pareto improvement,while the cost-sharing contract under the constraint of wholesale price can achieve the coordination of supply chain under certain conditions.