A Study On Incentive Policies And Regulatory Strategies Of Photovoltaic Generation Under Asymmetric Information

Currently,climate change mitigation has become a worldwide issue,many countries including China has forwarded various measures to limit greenhouse gas emissions and optimize energy structure,among which boosting the development of renewable power is the most popular policy.Photovoltaic(PV)power,one of the dominant generation forms of renewable energy,has gained popularity in recent years mainly due to its rapid development in technology.Along with the decrease in generation cost,the installed capacity of the PV power has increased tremendously.This dissertation has investigated the incentive policies to better the development of the PV power industry.It has also further explored measures to avoid the moral hazard behaviors of cost padding in Photovoltaic(PV)generation and to take full advantage of PV leader base programme characterized as relieving poverty under the complex information.Related discussion mainly includes the following contents.First,this dissertation frames the conception of renewable generation incentive and regulatory mechanism under asymmetric information.Considering the rule of cost reimbursement,it employs the revelation principle to screen the power plants' technological type.Based on these analyses,the dissertation deduces the principal-agent optimization model,the envelope theorem of continuous screening problem and the general differential game model.It further forwards solutions to these models in way of optimal control theory.In addition,the dissertation compares three commonly adopted incentive policies of renewable power generation under a complex political and information environment,which are feed-in-tariffs(FITs),renewable portfolio standard(RPS)and their combination.The results show that the combined incentive policy works best in the early stage of PV power development because it can neutralize the drastic fluctuation of social welfare brought by FITs or RPS;RPS is favorable when the levelized cost of renewable generation is lower than that of fossil energy generation.Third,the dissertation explores the optimal supervision strategy in the implementation of subsidy policy.It has considered the strategies of participants involving in bidding of the project of photovoltaic power leader base,that is principal,the tenderee and the bidding company.Among them,there may be collusion between the tenderee and the bidding company.It reaches several valuable insights by employing perfect Bayesian equilibrium analytical technique.First,low price bidding may avoid collusion.Second,only in high generation cost,high tax,low stability and low popularity of high-tech may the low-price bidding method be adopted.Third,it is not desirable to simply eliminate inefficient PV firms with a strengthened regulatory means.Nevertheless,the practice of laissez-faire collusion may lead to even worse results.Finally,the dissertation studies the supervision strategy of sophisticated moral hazard.In view of cost padding and collusion,it employs perfect Bayesian equilibrium and mechanism design methods to explore measures that may help to avoid collusion under relaxed,harsh and moderate supervisions.The theoretical analyses draw several key theoretical conclusions.First,PV supplier has an incentive to engage in cost padding in poverty relief.Second,harsh supervision can backfire when market cannot eradicate collusion entirely.Third,harsh supervision is preferable when there is plenty of collusion in the market.