Research On The Incentive Mechanism Design Of Rail Transit Project Under PPP Mode

Due to rail transit has unique advantages,the rapid development cities in China,but the government financial capacity is limited,can meet the strong demand for rail transit development,this is we need to broaden the source of funds,the introduction of social capital involved.Cooperation for a long time,the government and social capital to participate in the construction of infrastructure projects,because of the lack of a scientific and effective incentive mechanism to regulate both sides of the conflict of interest,the project construction difficulties.In this paper,the rail transit project construction by the study of the incentive mechanism design,effectively balance the relationship between the interests of both parties,specification of the government and social capital both inefficient and unreasonable behavior,activate the market vigor,arouse the enthusiasm of the social investment,improve the quality and efficiency of the public service supply.This article from the perspective of the principal-agent theory to consider the design of incentive mechanism,to encourage the PPP model in the construction of rail transit project can play a good effect.First of all,the cooperation of government and social capital financing model and principal-agent theory in-depth research and analysis,combined with the characteristic of rail transit project,further expounds the rail traffic construction the necessity of introducing social capital;Second,analyzed and studied based on the principal-agent theory how to incentive mechanism of the PPP mode rail transit projects for the design,from two angles of adverse selection and moral hazard,on the adverse selection,the main problem is to prevent the agent using the ex ante information asymmetry,choose against the principal decision-making behavior,to avoid the unqualified agents into the phenomenon of "winning optimal eliminating" of the project;On the moral risk,the main problem is to prevent the agent by using information asymmetry,and make the opportunism behavior,and both sides of the moral integrity;Finally,in this paper,the design of incentive mechanism and the practice of Beijingmetro line 4 case application,the combination of line 4 success just illustrates how to design a set of scientific and reasonable incentive mechanism for the government and the importance of the construction of social capital cooperation projects,at the same time,the future development of the urban rail transit in wuhan introduction of social capital provide a good reference value.The research achievements of this paper lies in for the future development of urban rail transit projects in China,provides a set of scientific and reasonable incentive mechanism system,on how to prevent before-and-after information asymmetry problem,made a complete perspective of incentives,and creatively based on principal-agent theory model,the two sides of the principal and agent,the game behavior of incentive and constraint in order to achieve the interests of both the equilibrium.