Reach On Choice And Incentive For Engineering Supervision

The supervisory system of engineering introduced 20 years, worked the huge promotion effect to our country's capital construction,had guaranteed the project quality and the time, the active control project investment, has obtained the obvious economic efficiency and the social efficiency. Although has achieved some achievements, but some questions have exposed gradually:Supervision of the market barriers to entry relatively low, large numbers of "unworthy of the name" the supervision units enters in which, plays the role fully with difficulty, reduced the entire overseeing profession quality. Supervision of the bidding competition mechanisms are not yet perfect, because of supervision for the construction industry is to provide services of high intelligence industry, its tender, the contract is not appropriate to implement the lowest business contracts, should be explored in line with long-term mechanism for supervision of the industry. Moreover, because after contract signed the owner and the supervision unit existence information asymmetrical situation, causes certain supervision unit to honor an agreement in the process congenial behavior. Therefore, bidding to establish an effective mechanism for supervision units and the incentive mechanism is an urgent need to address the problem.The article begins by describing the project management in the principal-agent relationship between owners and Supervision and the resulting principal-agent problem, by unit owners and supervisory issues related to the principal-agent incentive and restraint mechanisms of an analysis of clear supervision units in the bidding adverse selection problems and moral hazard problem supervision units.In the bidding stage, through supervision units bidding for the analysis of adverse selection and bidding mechanisms Game Analysis of the Landlord and supervision units to explore the owners have chosen to supervision units in order to prevent "adverse selection" of the relevant measures.In the performance stage, explicit incentives and implicit incentives are analyzed. First, in the principal-agent theory within the framework of the supervision of the causes of moral hazard is analyzed by mathematical modeling methods, respectively; symmetric information and asymmetric information in both cases, the owners of the supervisory unit of incentive compensation design factors were discussed, proposed to improve the linear compensation model. In addition, by reputation model analysis resulted in game times'on the reputation of impact. Comprehensive consideration on this basis, explicit incentives and implicit incentives game model, analysis of unit owners and Supervision Strategies...