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Research On Incentive Contracts Based On Contractor Moral Hazard Prevention

Posted on:2020-03-26Degree:MasterType:Thesis
Country:ChinaCandidate:Y Y WangFull Text:PDF
GTID:2392330599951384Subject:Technical Economics and Management
Abstract/Summary:PDF Full Text Request
China's construction industry has been expanding in scale and strength,and has always maintained a sustainable development trend.Due to the excessive number of contractors in China,some of them are hungry and unscrupulous.In order to win the bidding and win the contract at low profit or even at a loss,they use their own information advantages in the construction stage to save costs and increase revenue by cutting corners and shoddy goods.In order to prevent this problem,the proprietor usually employs the supervising unit to strengthen the supervision,but the supervising unit may collude with the contractor in order to pursue its own interests and cover up the contractor's illegal behaviors to the detriment of the proprietor's interests.Therefore,for the contractor's moral hazard,incentive contract is an effective strategy to prevent this problem,and reasonable risk allocation is a means of incentive contract.At present,research shows that few scholars have studied the combination of reasonable risk allocation with incentive contracts and moral hazard of contractors,especially on specific incentive clauses.In conclusion,this paper constructs incentive contracts based on reasonable risk sharing according to incentive theory,principal-agent theory and rational risk allocation theory.The specific research contents are as follows:First,study on the factors influencing the moral hazard of owners and contractors.Firstly,it analyzes the principal-agent problem between the owner and the contractor,namely adverse selection and moral hazard,to provide theoretical guidance for the following study on the moral hazard of the contractor.Then,through literature review,the author comprehensively identified the influencing factors of moral hazard,including asymmetric information distribution,incomplete contract and unbalanced convertible cost.Finally,through semi-structured interview,the identified influencing factors are verified and improved,and it is an effective strategy to prevent the moral hazard of contractors to make clear reasonable risk allocation and incentive contracts.Second,research on moral hazard prevention measures based on incentive contract construction.Firstly,based on law and economics,this paper innovatively puts forward two principles of reasonable risk allocation for contractor's moral risk.On this basis,comparative analysis of the unit price contract and price contract and cost plus remuneration allocation of risks between the owner and contractor in the contract.It is the main model of incentive contract to define cost plus incentive cost contract.Then,through the text analysis under the traditional mode of the relevant contract template,extract reflects the owner to contractor incentive content;Finally,based on the above incentive content,combined with the actual case analysis to summarize the owner of the contractor in the quality,cost,progress,safety and other five aspects of the incentive clause specific setting content.Third,based on the pattern of partnering moral risk improvement strategy research.Firstly,through the analysis of the traditional mode and the main characteristics of partnering model,highlight the core of the partnering model for laid a theoretical foundation to improve the incentive contract of;Then,from the work flow planning,organization structure,constructing and incentive points based on ECC contract confirmed three sides of the path to improve the incentive contract of research,summed up the incentive contract based on the pattern of partnering improvement list;Finally,based on the reputation mechanism and the development path of partnering mode,to explore the application range of the partnering model in our country.In conclusion,in this paper,based on the principal-agent theory,and based on the contractor's moral hazard,and utilization of literature review,methods of text analysis,case analysis,through the influence factors of comprehensive identification contractor moral risk,build a suitable incentive contract based on the reasonable risk allocation in China,to the contractor's incentive for home owners to provide theoretical basis and practical guidance.
Keywords/Search Tags:Moral Hazard, Incentive Contracts, Reasonable Risk Allocation, Partnering Mode
PDF Full Text Request
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