Model Of Strategy Portfolio Of Control Of Moral Hazard Of Highway Engineering Supervision And Application Research

Moral hazard problem has become a hot issue in the fields of finance, insurance, banking and so on, literature review shows that there is very little research of this problem in the field of highway construction, more specifically, on how to control and eliminate unilateral moral hazard in highway construction supervision. In construction of highway projects, the incompleteness of contract of highway construction supervisor due to the information asymmetry, which can lead to the existence of double moral hazard between principal and agent.In view of this, paper focuses on how to control and eliminate unilateral moral hazard problem in highway construction supervision.Paper breaks through the analysis ideas of traditional principal-agent problem, in the contractual relationship analysis, paper assume that participants in highway construction projects transform from "economic man" to "social man", which acknowledges the existence of project owner and construction supervision bounded rationality and believes that people have a tendency of opportunism and self-interested behavior. Paper also analysis the relationship and the multi-task between multi-principal and multi-agent:such as many clients and many agents, and multi-task principal-agent relationship of project owner and highway construction supervision. Paper also analysis the information asymmetry and the incertain factors between project owner and construction supervision:the private information of them can’t be removed, which contributed to the double moral hazard existence forever.Paper based on the double-side moral hazard perspective of project owner and highway construction supervision, assumes the highway engineering supervision moral hazard theory and model conditions, expand the Holmstrom-Milgrom multitasking principal-agent model, built the models like relationship contract of highway construction supervision, the degree of associated multi-task, the game of collusion, the optimal supervision and reputation evaluation. Paper argues that in order to control and elimination of unilateral moral hazard of highway engineering supervision, we must establish a contractual relationship to be able to bind both parties act, strengthen the supervision on agent behavior, and built the social credit evaluation mechanism for agents of the combination strategy.Optimal contract mechanism in portfolio strategy which is the head of research recognizes that it should built the contract scheme that dominated by highway engineering supervision formal contract and supplemented by highway engineering supervision relationship contract, relies on the "self-compliance" constraints in highway construction supervision relationship contract to control and eliminate the unilateral moral hazard. Based on the objectives and tasks of supervision work of mathematical analysis and empirical study on correlation degree analysis, the incentive and inducement mechanism thinks that the project owner should strengthening the incentive and inducement on complementary task, solve the problem of the level of agent effort by incentive induction method, promote the objectives and tasks of supervision work to achieve, control and eliminate unilateral moral hazard of highway engineering supervision purposes. Based on the analysis of collusive behavior of highway engineering supervision, and the clients optimal monitoring utility, optimal supervision mechanism believes that strengthening supervision will effectively control collusive behavior, and "don’t work hard", "not tell the truth" behavior in highway engineering supervision, in order to control and eliminate unilateral moral hazard of highway engineering supervision. Based on analyzing the impact of credit rating for the agent level of effort, portfolio strategy reputation evaluation mechanism believes that the reputation evaluation can effectively incite agents in highway engineering supervision to work hard, can achieve the purposes that control and eliminate unilateral moral hazard of highway engineering supervision. In paper research, optimal contract, incentive and inducement, optimal supervision and credit evaluation mechanism are the optimal portfolio strategy of controlling and eliminating the moral hazard in highway engineering supervision.Paper considers that the using of portfolio strategy is a beneficial attempt of information economics, agency theory and contract theory in highway construction projects, it is also a beneficial innovation in theory. Paper argues that portfolio strategy is an effective and innovative solution to control and eliminate highway construction supervision unilateral moral hazard under highway construction projects.