The Politics Of Property Rights:Property Rights Structure,Public Goods Supply And Traditional Village Governance

The relationship between property rights and governance is a core issue in the study of property rights politics.Property rights,as a fundamental institutional arrangement,have an important impact on governance.In the past research on the relationship between property rights and governance,there were two basic paths:"property rights-system-state(governance)" and "political strategy-property rights system".However,the above two approaches face difficulties in explaining the practice of property rights and governance in traditional Chinese villages.Based on this,within the theoretical framework of property rights politics,this article constructs an explanation path of "property rights structure-public goods supply-governance type".Using field materials from Xiejia Village,South China,Xiaodi Village,Central China and Peijia Village,North China,based on case analysis,case comparison and regional comparison,this paper studies the internal mechanism of property rights structure that influences the supply of public goods to shape traditional village governance.The research in this paper shows:First,there is a strong correlation between the village property rights structure,the supply of public goods,and village governance.(1)The supply of public goods is closely related to the village governance model.The process of public goods supply is an important part of village public governance.The performance of public goods supply is an important indicator of village governance performance.The structure of public goods supply is an important symbol of the power structure of villages.(2)The supply of public goods is closely related to the village property rights structure.The supply cost of basic public goods in villages dominated by public property rights is mainly borne by the benefits of public property rights.The supply of public goods in the villages dominated by private property rights is mainly provided by farmers' voluntary joint supply.The village property right structure directly affects the mode and level of public goods supply.(3)The supply of public goods is a key intermediary variable linking the structure of village property rights and the mode of village governance.The structure of property rights can shape the type of village governance by affecting the mode of supply of public goods.Secondly,the mechanism of property rights structure plastic village governance has the characteristics of type and regionalization,and there are obvious differences among villages of different types and regions.(1)The property structure dominated by public property rights in the clan-type villages in South China has formed a supply model of public goods based on a unified clan organization,which in turn has formed a unified power structure and an elder authority governance model;(2)The property rights structure dominated by private property rights in the households in central China has formed a supply model of public goods based on voluntary unions,which has shaped a decentralized power structure based on ownership and autonomous governance based on voluntary unions;(3)In North China club-type villages,the property rights structure that places equal emphasis on public and private property rights has formed a public goods supply model based on diversified clubs,which in turn has formed a multi-center power structure and multi-authority governance model based on village,club,and clan authority.Finally,the general mechanism for shaping village governance by property right structure is the adaptive isomorphism of the three aspects of property rights structure,public goods supply,and village governance types.(1)The influencing factors of the governance of the villages in the clan-type villages in South China,the North China Association-type villages,and the family-centered villages in central China have a positive covariance.That is,a high-powered property concentration model creates a highauthority governance model,while a low-powered property concentration model shapes a low-authority(high autonomy)governance model.(2)From the South China Village to the North China Village to the Central China Village's regional spatial sequence,the influencing factors of traditional village governance that are shaped by the structure of property rights show a gradual decrease or a consistent direction.(3)The trend of positive covariance and consistency shows that in the process of shaping traditional village governance,the structure of property rights,the supply of public goods,the structure of power,and the governance model have isomorphic mechanisms.And the above factors are mutually adjusted and adapted in the process of isomorphism.In addition,from the perspective of national governance,the governance of property-structured plastic villages requires certain institutional and social foundations.In the traditional period,the absence of the state in the village is the basis of external conditions;the basic public goods of the farmers need to be the endogenous power base;the separation of the ownership of the public property rights of the village and the main body of the right of income is the basis of their relationship of rights;The correlation mechanism between structure and public goods supply;performance legitimacy and authoritative reproduction is the correlation mechanism between public goods supply and village governance.