Research On The Dynamics Of Incentive Strategies For Collective Actions Of Cooperation

Cooperative behavior is ubiquitous in nature and human society.However,cooper-ators need to sacrifice their own interests to benefit other individuals,which renders that cooperation is an irrational choice.How to understand the emergence and persistence of altruistic behavior among individuals has long been an enormous challenge for research community,which has attracted the attention of scholars from various fields including mathematics,biology,economics,control science,computer science.In recent years,incentive strategy as an effective control means to promote cooperation has attracted ex-tensive attention.Based on evolutionary game theory,this dissertation explores the evo-lutionary dynamics of incentive strategies for collective actions of cooperation from the following four aspects.Firstly,we investigate the evolutionary dynamics of pool exclusion strategy,which has been widely regarded as a control strategy to promote cooperative behavior.However,it remains unclear whether prosocial exclusion can still favor cooperation when antiso-cial exclusion is introduced.Here we propose two different exclusion strategies,namely,prosocial pool exclusion and antisocial pool exclusion,to investigate the evolutionary dy-namics of exclusion strategies in infinite and finite populations.The results in infinite populations show that the introduction of prosocial pool exclusion can promote the evolu-tion of cooperation.But when considering also antisocial pool exclusion,we show that the system exhibits evolutionary oscillations.In finite populations,we find that the introduc-tion of antisocial exclusion inhibits cooperation,but it does not reduce the evolutionary advantage of prosocial exclusion.Secondly,we explore the evolutionary dynamics of exclusion strategy in repeated public goods games.In our approach,excluders need to monitor the decisions of all group members permanently to identify free-riding behaviors,and decide to expel them from ob-taining group benefits,and the excluded individuals can only obtain benefits from public goods of previous rounds.In infinite populations,we observe evolutionary oscillations among cooperators,defectors,and excluders when free-riders can be expelled at the earli-est stage.Similarly,stochastic evolution in finite populations can favor cooperation over defection when timely exclusion is implemented.Our results highlight that immediate exclusion is more successful in solving the mentioned enigma of cooperative behavior.Thirdly,we study the co-evolutionary dynamics of exclusion and punishment strate-gies.Although previous studies have found that both punishment and exclusion strategies can promote the evolution of cooperation,it is still unclear which strategy has more evo-lutionary advantages when punishment and exclusion strategies are both present.Here we study the direct competition between different types of punishment and exclusion in finite populations.We find that no matter whether the public goods game is optional or com-pulsory,peer exclusion can outperform all other strategies in the absence of second-order exclusion and punishment,while pool exclusion prevails when second-order sanctioning is considered.Our results demonstrate that exclusion is a more powerful incentive strategy than punishment for the resolution of social dilemmas.Finally,we investigate the evolutionary dynamics of incentive strategies in games of corruption.Considering that incentive agencies are vulnerable to corruption,it is unclear whether incentive strategies can still effectively promote the emergence of cooperation when enforcers fall into corruption.Here we investigate the evolution of cooperation when punishers and defectors fall into corruption probabilistically.When anti-corruption con-trol measures are not considered,we find that the cooperative behavior can be maintained in the population in two different ways.First,cooperators,defectors,and punishers can coexist where the portions of all strategies are stable in time.Second,the three strategies can dominate each other in a cyclic way similarly to the well-known rock-scissors-paper cycle or the heteroclinic cycle.Furthermore,when considering anti-corruption control measures,we find that excluding both corrupt defectors and corrupt punishers can more effectively promote the emergence of cooperation for a larger parameter range.Our re-sults reveal the mechanism of cooperation maintaining in games of corruption,which can provide some theoretical insights for the design of anti-corruption control measures.