Member Behavior-oriented Decision Optimization Of Logistics Service Supply Chain

The rapid development of global economic integration and e-commerce has brought an unprecedented huge market to the logistics industry,and the logistics service has become an important driving force for global economic development.With the continuous differentiation of advantageous capabilities of upstream and downstream,enterprise with resource and information advantages has transformed to the role of logistics service integrator(LSI),while the enterprises that are good at basic logistics services become functional logistics service providers(FLSP).Through the joint efforts of LSI and FLSP,they can provide customers with logistics service solutions and realize value creation,thus forming the basic structure of the logistics service supply chain(LSSC): "FLSP-LSI-Customer".Different from the traditional operations management research,from the view of behavioral operations management,decision-makers are often affected by social preferences,so that they may modify the decision goals and make the most satisfactory decisions.Some research conclusions based on the assumption of "rational economic man" are no longer applicable,as they ignore the influence of behavior factors.It is of great significance to study the member behaviororiented decision optimization of LSSC.This thesis first systematically reviews the research status of the two major areas,that is LSSC management and behavioral operations management.Based on the literature review,the shortcomings of existing research and the research focus of this thesis are pointed out.By constructing four typical decision-making scenarios,the impact mechanisms of key behavioral factors in the corresponding scenarios are analyzed.The specific research conclusions are summarized as follows:First,this thesis constructs an order allocation scenario of LSSC,and solves a Stackelberg game among an LSI and two FLSPs who have entered the market successively.Combining the behavioral heterogeneity of peer member innovatively,this thesis discusses the impacts of the incumbent FLSP's distributional fairness concern and the new entrant FLSP's peer-induced fairness concern on the decisionmaking.The thesis shows that the optimal pricing,the optimal service innovation level,and the LSI's optimal utility increase with the latter FLSP's peer-induced fairness concern,and decrease with the incumbent FLSP's distributional fairness concern.When two types of fairness concerns coexist,then the final impact on decision-making depends on the relationship between the competition coefficient and price coefficient.LSI can achieve maximal utility when there only exists the peer-induced fairness concern.Based on the above results,an incentive contract in the form of membership fee and profit sharing is proposed.This thesis finds that when the parameters meet a certain condition,the decision optimization and the improvement of LSI's utility can be realized.Besides,three model extension cases are discussed: considering different fairness concern coefficients;considering the wholesale price as the endogenous decision variable;and considering the advantage and disadvantage fairness concerns,and this thesis verifies the robustness of relevant conclusions.Second,this thesis constructs an order allocation scenario of LSSC under uncertain demand,and builds a Stackelberg game model among an LSI,a key FLSP and an ordinary FLSP.From the perspective of global optimization,the individual and interaction impacts of the LSI's risk aversion behavior,peer competition between two FLSPs,and the relationship strength between LSI and FLSP are analyzed.This thesis concludes that the risk aversion behavior has negative impacts on the optimal pricing,optimal level of quality commitment,and level of quality assurance of service product,while peer competition and relationship strength have positive impacts.There are interaction influences among the three factors: the "offset effect",the "amplification effect",and the "equilibrium effect".Two improvement strategies are proposed accordingly,that is the "limited improvement" achieved by adjusting the strength of three factors,and the "complete improvement" achieved by implementing the“incentive upgrade and cost sharing” contract.In addition,this thesis discusses the model extension where there exists a certain relationship between the service commitment level and the service assurance level,and verifies the robustness of the relevant conclusions.Third,this thesis considers the development background of the intelligent transformation of the logistics industry,constructs a scenario of data value transformation in the LSSC and solves the Stackelberg game among one LSI,one incumbent FLSP and one new entrant FLSP.Considering the differences in the service process and characteristic of LSI and FLSP,this thesis divides the data value transformed during the service offering into demand and supply-driven data value,and examines the impact of LSI's altruistic behavior during the data value sharing.This thesis finds that the LSI's optimal pricing and FLSPs' optimal value-added service levels decrease with the conversion ratio of demand-driven data value,resulting in the phenomenon of "demand-driven data value paradox";increase with the conversion ratio of supply-driven data value and the LSI can get higher utility at no cost,achieving the "free-riding effect".When the LSI shows the altruistic behavior,the optimal solutions increase with the altruistic degree and a "transmission effect" occurs among three factors.When the parameters meet a certain condition,customers can obtain an "optimal purchasing area" and gain higher level of value-added service at lower price.Finally,this thesis conducts a multi-case study based on in-depth investigations of four Chinese logistics enterprises,and explores the impact of customers' impatient behavior on LSSC's performance.The thesis finds that that the impatient behavior affects the LSSC's performance through three mediator factors,namely the synergy degree,the risk aversion degree,and the peer competition strength.At the same time,the enterprise's control power in LSSC is the moderator and influences the impacts of the three mediator factors.A customer behavior-oriented theoretical framework for the performance management of LSSC is obtained accordingly.The conclusions obtained in this thesis can not only enrich academic theories in related fields of LSSC and behavioral operations,but also provide novel management insights and decision references for stakeholders in the logistics industry.