Research On Evolutionary Analysis And Operational Strategy Of A Sustainable Tourism Service System

With the rapid development of China's economy,the living standard of people is getting better and better,which has stimulated the vigorous development of the tourism industry.The increasing tourism consumption activities have also brought some problems to China's tourism industry,such as poor tourism service experience for tourists,chaotic product pricing and environmental pollution.Meanwhile,the purchasing decisions of tourists,the product operational decisions of tourism enterprises and the government's policy-making are affected by more factors.The traditional complete rational assumption theory has been difficult to characterize the various behavior features of decision-makers in reality.In the context of sustainable development,incorporating tourism stakeholders'behavior preferences is to investigate how tourism service system to implement product operations;how to set marketing prices;how to select effective contracts for improving the operational performance of a tourism service supply chain system and how does the operations strategy of the tourism service system evolve?These issues are not only innovative in theory,but also have very important practical application value.Based on the evolutionary game theory,game theory and differential game etc.,this paper establishes mathematical models and conducts numerical simulation to deeply investigate the above issues.The research content can be mainly divided into the following four parts.(1)Study the evolutionary stability strategy of tourism service system considering tourists' environmental preference and government supervision.This chapter builds a tripartite dynamic evolutionary game model including local governments,tourism companies and tourists.Based on this model,this chapter first analyzes the evolutionary stability of the government' s green supervision strategy,the tourism enterprise's green innovation strategy,and the tourists' purchasing strategy.Then,it discusses the long-term evolutionary stability strategy between tourism enterprises and tourists with and without the government's green tourism supervision mechanism.The finding shows that government's green tourism supervision,tourism enterprise's green innovation and tourist's green product purchasing decisions are interdependent under certain condition.When tourists' environmental preference is relatively high,tourism companies are willing to spontaneously carry out green tourism innovation.When it is relatively low,tourism companies often choose traditional tourism pattern.This chapter further proposes an effective green tourism incentive mechanism for government to promote the transformation of China's traditional tourism to green tourism.(2)Investigate the evolutionary stability strategy of competitive tourism service system considering tourists'environmental preference.This chapter first introduces tourists' environmental preference into the Classical Hotelling model,and then constructs a horizontal competition game model.This chapter further constructs two repeated game models between these two tourism enterprises,and analyzes the dynamic evolutionary stability of each enterprise's green tourism strategy.In order to encourage all tourism companies to implement green tourism,this chapter proposes an effective green tourism subsidy mechanism for government to achieve socio-economic benefit maximum with minimal financial expenditure.(3)Explore the optimal green tourism products introduction strategy for the two-stage tourism service supply chain system in the presence of corporate social responsibility.This chapter mainly considers that the tourism service provider may have three different levels of corporate social responsibility preference,namely,she cares about the interests of green tourists,or regular tourists,or both.The conclusions indicate that the different social responsibility preference of tourism service provider would greatly affect the pricing decision of the tourism service supply chain system,and thus affects the market demand.Additionally,the study finds that the introduction of green tourism products by tourism service integrator does not means that the market demand of regular tourism products will reduce,while it sometimes promotes the marketing of regular tourism products.More importantly,it can be found that the introduction of green tourism products may also benefit the tourism service provider with corporate social responsibility preference.(4)Solve the optimal tourism service level,carbon emission reduction effort,advertising effort and contract design in a low-carbon tourism service supply chain system considering corporate social responsibility.This chapter focuses on a tourism service supply chain including a tourism service provider responsible for carbon emission reduction effort and service improvement and a tourism service integrator responsible for low-carbon advertising.It mainly discusses three possible cost-sharing decisions for the tourism service integrator,namely,not sharing any cost,sharing carbon emission reduction cost or sharing service cost of the tourism service provider.In this chapter,three differential game models are established to explore the optimal decisions of tourism service supply chain members under various contracts.Through a comparative analysis of the three types of cost-sharing contracts,this chapter identifies the optimal cost-sharing contract and corresponding conditions under which both the tourism service provider and tourism service integrator can obtain more benefits.The research results of this dissertation not only enrich the relevant basic theories in the field of tourism service operations and management and broaden its application scope,but also provide management implications for managers on tourism product distribution and tourism service supply chain operations.