Game Analysis On Supply Chain Management Of Low-carbon Tourism Guided By Government

In the trend of global warming, international community achieved relevant cooperation frameworks to cope with climate change. China is actively undertaking emission reduction commitments, paying high attention to low-carbon economy. As a green travel mode with low energy consumption, low emission pollution, the development of low-carbon tourism is the positive response of national carbon reduction strategy, also the essential requirement of heavy reliance on ecological environment. The dissertation makes a try to introduce supply chain management to low- carbon tourism research, and adopts the methods of game theory on the competition and cooperation among major subjects in low-carbon tourism supply chain. The optimal decisions and profit levels about development strategy, market mechanism, and vertical cooperation of low-carbon tourism are obtained by building different mathematical models between government and enterprise, between hotel and travel agency, and between tourism attraction and travel agency, for seeking scientific and reasonable optimized path of low-carbon tourism supply chain. The main conclusion and innovative points of the dissertation lie in the following aspects:(1) The concept of low-carbon tourism supply chain and the guidance of supply chain management to the development of low-carbon tourism are proposed. The structure of low-carbon tourism supply chain guided by government is developed based on the structural characters of traditional supply chain and service supply chain. Then we determine the game analysis framework including four aspects, which are the evolution of government and enterprise’s low carbon strategy, regional lowcarbon cooperation, hotel low-carbon advertising strategy, and vertical cooperation between tourism attraction and travel agency, considering the realistic basis of tourism supply chain management.(2) For exploring the incentive function of carbon emission standards and the corresponding mechanism of rewards and punishments to low-carbon tourism, the evolutionary game model of the local governments’ low-carbon supervisory control strategies and the tourism enterprises’ low-carbon operational strategies is established. The dissertation probes into the evolutionary stability of these two interest groups and its influencing factors, hoping to provide a reference for the improvement of lowcarbon supervisory mechanism. Therefore, we consider adopting the mechanism of regional tourism carbon asset accounting to insert the low-carbon comprehensive benefits into government performance examination and enterprise operating audit. A dynamic differential game model with is established to explore the contribution of government investment in public utilities and enterprise investment in low-carbon transition to regional tourism carbon asset.(3) A low-carbon tourism supply chain composed by a hotel and a travel agency, which carry out low-carbon advertising in the way of brand promotion and product promotion respectively, is studied. The coordination of low-carbon advertising that match the current situation of tourism industry are gain by comparing advertising equilibriums between the decentralized decision including Nash and Stackelberg models and the centralized decision represented by fully cooperation model. Then, the demand function of low-carbon tourism attraction including basic consumption utility, low-carbon consumption utility and the effect of low-carbon advertising is built based on the low-carbon system of tourism attraction. Moreover, considering low-carbon service and publicity promote low-carbon consumption utility together, a differential game model between tourist attraction and travel agency is established to explore the feasible solution of vertical low-carbon cooperation.