The Behavioral Logic,Effect Evaluation,and Policy Optimization Of Local Governments On Smog Management

With the tightening of resource constraints and the intensification of environmental overdrafts,the contradiction between economic growth and environmental protection in China has become increasingly prominent.In particular,the persistent and widespread outbreak of smog in 2013 sounded the alarm for ecological protection in China.After nearly 10 years of management practices,the smog pollution in China has been suppressed to a certain extent.However,smoggy weather is still "occasional",and even develops to "normalization",so smog management has become an urgent requirement to protect people’s health and maintain the sustainable economy development of China under the "carbon peaking and carbon neutrality"goals.For a long time,the practice of smog management in China is manifested as a "top-down"guided management model and a "hoe one’s own row" territorial autonomy model.As an important subject of smog management,the behavioral logic of local government on smog management is deeply restricted by intergovernmental relations and the complex game of interest subjects behind it,resulting in low enthusiasm and initiative of local governments in smog management.In view of this,how to effectively stimulate the endogenous power of local governments has become an entry point to promote effective and precise smog management,which requires us to systematically sort out the behavioral logic of local government on smog management and summarize behavioral characteristic from the perspective of current intergovernmental relations,thereby providing technical supports and value references for optimizing smog management policies of local government.Based on the research needs and according to the research idea of "problem discovery→theoretical foundation→ logical deduction→status quo characterization→effect evaluation→policy orientation",the paper focuses on how the local government can perform efficient smog management,based on the public goods theory,and intergovernmental relations theory,a theoretical analysis framework for the behavioral logic of local government on smog management is constructed from the perspective of intergovernmental relations,starting from the vertical principal-agent relationship and the horizontal intergovernmental competition and cooperation relationship.Second,using the extended multilevel principal-agent model and evolutionary game model,we logically derive how to achieve the optimal balance of incentives and constraints in the principal-agent relationship and the optimal equilibrium between competition and cooperation in the intergovernmental competition relationship.Third,various measurement methods such as spatial econometric model,moderation effect model,and panel threshold model are used to discuss the effects of smog management under vertical principalagent relationship and horizontal inter-governmental competition relationship as well as the behavior characteristics of local government.Finally,combined with the research conclusions,we put forward feasible policy recommendations to strengthen the smog management effect of local government.The specific contents of this paper are as follows:Chapter 1 is the introduction,which presents the realistic background and research progress of local government smog management from the perspective of intergovernmental relations,and clarify the research topic of this paper.We clearly define the intension of intergovernmental relations and local government behavior,where intergovernmental relations are defined as vertical hierarchical relations and horizontal intergovernmental relations based on intergovernmental administrative relations.Based on data availability and research ideas,the research object is defined as prefecture-level city government.Then,we systematically sort out and summarize the existing relevant literature from four aspects:intergovernmental relationship and local government behavior,smog management and government responsibility,vertical intergovernmental relationship and smog management,horizontal intergovernmental relationship and smog management,so as to clarify the research space of this paper.Chapter 2 expounds the theoretical basis and behavioral logic of the local government on smog management from the perspective of intergovernmental relations.Based on public goods theory,and intergovernmental relations theory,this paper discusses the internal behavior logic of local government on smog management from the perspective of intergovernmental relations in two dimensions:vertical intergovernmental relations and horizontal intergovernmental relations.In the vertical dimension,starting from the principal-agent relationship of smog management,a "perceive-judgment-response-feedback" analysis model is constructed to reveal the causes of the unity of central policy goals and the fragmentation of local implementation goals,as well as reveal the root cause of the paradox of collective action in smog management.In the horizontal dimension,starting from the external characteristics of smog and the theory of collaborative management,and following the theoretical analysis idea of "behavioral motivation-air quality-collaborative management",the contradiction and conflict between individual behavior and collaborative behavior in local government on smog management are revealed to clarify the basic conditions for realizing collaborative smog management among local governments.Chapter 3 discusses the behavioral game and logical deduction of local government on smog management from the perspective of intergovernmental relations.Combining the findings of the theoretical analysis in Chapter 2,a mathematical model is constructed to discuss the influence of incentive and restraint mechanism as well as competition and cooperation effect on smog management behavior of local government.(1)In the vertical dimension,an extended multilevel principal-agent model is built to discuss the optimal effort level and optimal incentive coefficient in smog management of local government under the incentive and constraint mechanism.The results show that when considering the chain multilevel principalagent relationship and multidimensional task objectives,the effort level of local government is related to the incentives of higher-level government and the marginal cost of the task,and the optimal effort level of the local government is related to the transformation level of social welfare,the top-down dual regulatory efforts,and the relative marginal cost of effort for multidimensional tasks.The optimal incentive of higher-level government to local government is positively related to the marginal cost of effort of local government;therefore,it is necessary to introduce higher incentives for delegated tasks with higher marginal costs to guarantee that local governments can actively perform the delegated tasks.(2)In the horizontal dimension,an evolutionary game model is used to construct a tripartite game model of "superior government-local government-local government at the same level",and to discuss the smog management behavior game and stable equilibrium strategy of local government in the horizontal intergovernmental relations.The results show that when the synergistic benefits of smog management and the spillover losses of smog pollution are included in the model,compared with the territorial autonomy model,the collaborative management of local governments has become the most ideal balanced choice in smog management,and as long as the net income of the local government when actively implementing the smog management policy is greater than zero,the smog control behavior of local government can be effectively motivated.However,when either local government adopts a non-cooperative strategy,and the other local government cannot compensate for the cost of smog control and the environmental loss caused by pollution spillover,the coordination and cooperation mechanism between local government cannot be realized,government competition will become the norm.Chapter 4 judges the evolution and stage effectiveness of intergovernmental relations and smog management.First,we systematically sort out the evolutionary trajectory and stage characteristics of intergovernmental relations in China from the two dimensions of vertical intergovernmental relations and horizontal intergovernmental relations.Second,using the quantitative analysis method of policy texts to analyze the policy trajectory and development context of environmental management in China,we found that air pollution is the primary focus of environmental management policies at the local level,and based on this,we clarify the start and end time of the study sample and specify the importance of choosing smog management as the research content again.Finally,the temporal and spatial characteristics and stage effects of local government on smog management are described,and it is found that the smog pollution of China has obvious stages,showing an overall trend of "sudden decrease in the early stage,smooth later stage,and occasional fluctuations".From the perspective of regional distribution,smog pollution presents a peak-shaped distribution characteristic of "low in the east and high in the middle",existing obvious regional differences.Chapter 5 is the empirical analysis of the behavioral characteristics and governance effect of local government on smog management under the principal-agent relationship.The logical derivation results in Chapter 3 show that incentives in the principal-agent relationship are the major factor influencing local government behavior.This chapter focuses on the influence of political incentives in the principal-agent relationship on the smog management behavior and the behavioral characteristics of local government under the interaction of incentives and constraints,and conducts empirical research using prefecture-level city data.The study found that,under the principal-agent relationship,the smog management behavior of local government presents the following characteristics:(1)The influence of political incentives on the level of smog management shows an inverted U-shaped characteristic,and with the growth of political incentives,the level of smog management in local government shows a trend of first rising and then falling.It shows that,since the establishment of the multi-dimensional performance appraisal systems,the opportunistic behavior of "focusing on the economy and ignoring environmental protection" in local government has been regulated to a certain extent,but the inertial performance orientation of local governments has not been fully reversed.When the political incentives are raised to a certain extent,the behavior of local government will still be distorted,indicating that the "political tournament" theory is "conditionally effective" during the sample period.(2)Environmental assessment constraints have a significant positive effect on improving smog management,and the interactive effect of environmental assessment constraints and political incentives can regulate the behavior of local governments on smog management.However,under the dual role of incentive and constraint mechanisms,the smog management of local governments show obvious governance bias characteristics,which manifests that local governments tend to manage pollutants with clear assessment targets,and the management behavior of pollutants with clear assessment targets is more weakly pulled by political incentives.(3)The policy instruments targeting the environmental governance of local governments have a significant substitution effect.Under the dual role of political incentives and assessment constraints,the financial environmental protection expenditure behavior and environmental administrative enforcement behavior of local governments show the strategic alternative characteristics of "one loose and the other tight" and"combination of loose and tight",and local governments respond to increased political incentives and enhanced environmental assessment constraints through the "lenient and strict" environmental regulatory instrument.Chapter 6 is the empirical analysis of the behavioral characteristics and governance effect of local government on smog management under the intergovernmental competition and cooperative relationships.The logical derivation in Chapter 3 shows that competitive relationship is the most prevalent form of current horizontal intergovernmental relations.This chapter focuses on the impact of government competition in the intergovernmental competition and cooperation relationship on the smog management of local government,as well as the behavioral characteristics of local government under the interaction of competition and cooperation,and uses a spatial econometric model for empirical analysis.The study found that,under the relationship of intergovernmental competition and cooperative,the smog management behavior of local government presents the following characteristics:(1)The influence of local government competition on the level of smog management shows a U-shaped characteristic of first inhibition and then promotion.With the improvement of the competitiveness of local government,the influence of local government on smog management has changed from a negative inhibitory effect to a positive promotion effect,indicating there is an appropriate behavioral adjustment point rather than a simple black or white affair between local government competition around foreign investment and the smog management in China,which provides reasonable explanations for the coexistence of the "pollution paradise"hypothesis and the "pollution halo" hypothesis.(2)Environmental governance cooperation among local governments can weaken the negative externality of pollution,"improve the governance efficiency,and have a positive effect on improving the level of smog management.The interaction between competition and cooperation among local governments has a significant moderating synergistic effect in smog management,which is manifested as a policy compensation effect at lower levels of local government competitiveness and as a synergistic enhancement effect at higher levels of local government competitiveness.(3)Local protectionist behavior,environmental administrative enforcement behavior,and technological innovation behavior play a nonlinear mediating role in the influence path of local government competition on smog management.With the improvement of local government competitiveness,local protectionism has changed from strong to weak,local environmental administrative enforcement has changed from lenient to strict,and local innovation strategies have moved from dependence to autonomy,together promoting the improvement of smog management.Chapter 7 is the research conclusions and policy recommendations.Combined with the results of theoretical analysis,mathematical deduction and empirical analysis,the policy recommendations for regulating the smog management behavior of local government and improving the effect of smog management are proposed in terms of optimizing and improving intergovernmental relations and promoting the co-management of multiple subjects.Specifically,in the vertical intergovernmental relationship,establish a scientific and effective incentive and constraint policy system for smog management;in terms of horizontal intergovernmental relations,innovate a collaborative management policy system with benign interaction among local governments;in terms of the subject of smog management,improve the social supervision policy environment with the wide participation of multiple subjects.