| The promotion of new energy vehicles is an important measure for China’s auto industry to achieve low-carbon transformation.Since 2001,China has introduced a series of industrial policies to increase the market share of new energy vehicles.Under the incentives of industrial policies,the sales of new energy vehicles increased from 0.5 thousand in 2010 to 1.206 million in 2019.However,while promoting the penetration of the new energy vehicle market,these incentive measures also have some drawbacks,such as excessive financial burden on the government and subsidy-oriented.Therefore,when it is reasonable to cancel the subsidy policy,how to design other incentive policies after the subsidy policy is cancelled,etc.need to be resolved urgently.However,Chinese scholars are currently mainly focusing on the effects of new energy vehicle industrial policies and the negative impact of the cancellation of subsidy policies on new energy vehicle sales,and have not given a clear answer to the above questions.In addition,the development of new energy vehicles in various provinces in China is seriously unbalanced.Some provinces can fully rely on market forces to promote the adoption of new energy vehicles,while some provinces still need to rely on policy support.These problems force us to re-examine the rationality and effectiveness of industrial policy design.Specifically,whether it is correct to implement a unified industrial policy across the country,and which provinces need special attention from the government.Finally,China has always attached great importance to developing its own new energy vehicles,hoping to achieve "curving overtaking" through new energy vehicles,however,few studies have explored the impact of changes in policies on the market share of different new energy vehicle models.From the perspective of indirect network effects,this study constructs a theoretical model in line with China’s new energy vehicle market and conducts empirical and simulation analysis based on the quarterly total sales data of new energy vehicles in 31 provinces from 2016 to2019.The GTWR model and nested Logit demand model are also used to explore the effects of spatial heterogeneity and product heterogeneity on the effects of industrial policy.This article answers: How effective are the different industrial policies adopted by China;when is it reasonable to completely cancel the car purchase subsidy;what is the equilibrium situation of China’s new energy vehicle market after the subsidy is canceled;what is the equilibrium situation of the new energy vehicle market in each province of China;which provinces need special attention from the government;how changes in industrial policies affect the equilibrium state of China’s new energy vehicle market;how changes in industrial policies affect the market share of different brands of new energy vehicles,etc.This study mainly got the following conclusions:First,this study finds significant indirect network effects in China’s NEV market.Based on the simulation based on the market conditions of China’s new energy vehicle market in the fourth quarter of 2019,the results show that 30 of China’s 31 provinces are in critical mass equilibrium,of which Liaoning,Ningxia,and Qinghai have not broken through the critical mass constraint point,and only Tibet is in the non-adoption equilibrium situation.Under equilibrium conditions,the number of new energy vehicles in 31 provinces is 61.103 million,and the number of charging piles is 14.894 million.Comparing the equilibrium situation of China’s new energy vehicle market in the fourth quarter of 2019 with the first quarter of 2016,the results show that Qinghai Province and Ningxia have changed from no equilibrium to critical mass equilibrium.The provinces that did not break through the critical mass constraint point in the first quarter of 2016 all successfully broke through the critical mass constraint point and reached a stable high adoption equilibrium point.Short-term subsidies for the construction of new energy vehicles and charging piles will not change the equilibrium state of the provinces.If the subsidy continues,the increase in the number of new energy vehicles and the number of charging piles under equilibrium conditions will not increase significantly,indicating that the state can completely cancel subsidies for new energy vehicles.A more stringent purchase restriction policy can transform the Tibet,which does not adopt the equilibrium situation,into a critical mass equilibrium situation,and help Liaoning Province,which has not broken through the critical mass constraint point,to break through the critical mass constraint point.At the same time,it is more conducive to improving the number of new energy vehicles in equilibrium than subsidy policies.Secondly,the results of GTWR show that there are obvious spatial differences in the indirect network effect in China’s new energy vehicle market,and the indirect network effect intensity is greater in the more mature new energy market.Bringing the indirect network effect coefficients of each province obtained by the GTWR model into the simulation model,the results show that among the 31 provinces in China,10 provinces belong to the non-adoption equilibrium situation,and the rest belong to the critical mass equilibrium situation,no province belongs to high adoption equilibrium.Among the provinces belonging to the critical mass equilibrium situation,only Guizhou Province has not broken through the critical mass constraint point.Fixing the new energy vehicle subsidies and charging pile subsidies respectively at the level of the fourth quarter of 2019 will not change the equilibrium situation of China’s new energy vehicle market,but the existence of both can help Guizhou Province break through the critical mass constraint point.If the winning rate of gasoline vehicles in provinces that do not currently implement the purchase restriction policy is reduced to 50%,simulation results show that Inner Mongolia is out of the situation of non-adoption equilibrium,and all provinces that belong to the situation of critical mass equilibrium have broken through the critical mass constraint point.If the winning rate of gasoline vehicles in provinces that do not currently implement the purchase restriction policy is reduced to 25%,Yunnan Province can also change from the non-adoption equilibrium situation to the critical mass equilibrium situation,and successfully break through the critical mass constraint point.Generally speaking,the promotion effect of improving the actual utility of the license plate policy is more obvious than the promotion effect of the subsidy policy.For provinces that belong to the non-adoption equilibrium situation,targeted industrial policies should be adopted to promote the development of their new energy vehicle markets.Finally,the counterfactual analysis based on the nested logit demand model shows that low-priced new energy vehicles are more sensitive to subsidies,and the cancellation of car purchase subsidies is more beneficial to imported models.The cancellation of subsidies for new energy vehicle models with a guide price of over 300,000 yuan increased the sales of new energy vehicles by 21,400 units,indicating that the cancellation of subsidies for high-priced new energy vehicle models is beneficial to the development of the entire new energy vehicle market.The increase in charging piles has a greater positive impact on pure electric vehicles and self-owned brand new energy vehicles,indicating that China can increase the adoption of pure electric vehicles and self-owned brand new energy vehicles by increasing the number of charging piles.Loose purchase restriction policies have a greater impact on plug-in hybrid vehicles and imported brand new energy vehicles;strict purchase restriction policies have a greater impact on pure electric vehicles and self-owned and joint venture brand new energy vehicles.It shows that the Chinese government can appropriately reduce the winning rate of gasoline vehicles in order to promote the sales of pure electric vehicles and self-owned brand new energy vehicles. |
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