The Relationship Between Incremental Value Mechanism And Revenue Distribution In China’s Ongoing Unified Rural-urban Construction Land Market:Empirical Analysis From Yangtze River Delta,Pearl River Delta And Chengdu-Chongqing Regions

Since the reform and opening up,a series of relatively perfect markets,such as labor market,capital market and technology market,have been established gradually.Land market,however,has still been segregated by the absence of legally rural construction land transaction because of its own land heterogeneity,fixed location and land use externalities.This kind of segmented land market where urban construction lands can enter the market freely while rural construction lands have to be traded privately has caused a range of realistic dilemmas,namely structural imbalance between supply and demand,the threat of―middle-income trap‖,―windfall-wipeout‖among stakeholder,and―trickle down effect‖between rural and urban areas.Therefore,it is of great significance to probe the coupling relationships between land value chain along conversion process and revenue network in which participants are gambling in an integrated market,which can be helpful to eliminate the institutional barriers of dualistic construction,rebuild the mechanisms of land increment and distribution,and establish a unified rural-urban land market.In order to explore the relationship between incremental value and revenue distribution in an integrated construction land market,this study developed a theoretical analysis framework of unified rural-urban land market,and measured the unfair degrees of income distribution among stakeholders in current segmented land market at first.Then this study concluded the incremental value chain and revenue network mechanism respectively based on empirical analysis about incremental mechanism and revenue allocation models in typical pilot areas of rural land market under the unified analysis framework.After that,it rebuilt taxation system and estimated the value of transfer of land development right to analyze the coupling mechanism between incremental value chain and revenue network.The details are as follows.Firstly,this dissertation made a theoretical framework of unified rural-urban land market in chapter 2 and analyzed the performance of land income distribution under current segregated land market in chapter 3.In chapter 2,four models of land income revenue distribution have been created in the theoretical analysis framework which composed of direct land market and virtual land market by referring a train of international lessons,classic theories and national innovations,namely―two stages model of revenue distribution of leasing collective construction land‖,―two stages model of revenue distribution of rental collective construction land‖,―three stages model of revenue distribution of trading collective construction land‖and―revenue distribution model in spatial displacement of collective construction land‖.In addition,Atkinson Index has been adopted in chapter 3 to measure the unfair degrees of income distribution among stakeholders.The results indicate that land income of government is sharply higher than that of peasants,meaning that most of the incremental land value has been grabbed by government,meanwhile it also show that the unfair degree of rural land expropriation is the lowest while the unfair degree of rural-urban conversion is the highest and the Atkinson indexes of rural-urban conversion,rural land expropriation and rural land reclamation are 0.9187,0.0099 and 0.3619 respectively.Secondly,this dissertation discussed the land incremental value mechanism,incremental value chain and revenue network in unified rural-urban construction land market,which are corresponding in chapter 4 and chapter 5.On the one hand,the incremental value mechanism in unified construction land market has been concluded from land lease,land rental and spatial displacement,and their incremental value chains have been drown as well.On the other hand,by using investigation data and case study,it analyzed the revenue relationship among players in rural construction land market from direct and virtual trading ways.There are four main results we achieved,（1）using hierarchical liner model（HLM）to investigate the pricing mechanism of rural construction land in leasing market,we found that individual characteristics,such as land area,land use type,and macro factors,like fixed investment and competition have a positive impact on the price of collective construction land;（2）with the help of Cobb-Douglas production function,the contribution of rural construction land in enterprises‘production has been estimated to be 0.17,and the contributions of capital and management in collectives‘activities have been estimated to be 0.47 and 0.22 respectively;（3）the result of truncated Tobit model used to measure the integration of rural collective demonstrates that the scale of rural construction land,population of share holders and uncertainty of market environment can effect the integration degree of collectives positively;（4）the optimal distribution ratios among collectives,enterprises and government in direct construction market derived from Shapely Value Game are 1/6P₁+（P₀-t₁P₁）/3P₀,1/6（P₂-P₁）+P₁/3（P₁+t₂）,1/2（t₁P₁/P₀）+t₂/3（P₁+t₂）respectively and the optimal distribution ratios,among government,peasants in reclamation area and peasants in receiving areas in spatial displacement are 2:3:3.Finally,the coupling mechanism between incremental value chain and revenue network has been discussed in chapter 6.In this part,two instruments—taxation and transfer of land development right,have been introduced to realize the coupling of value chain and revenue network,where optimal tax rate of trading construction land market and the value of land development right have been measured.Based on the surveys,the coupling mechanism between value chain and benefits network has been described as below,（1）in direct trading market,the optimal tax（t*=0.187P₁）has been estimated by supply and demand elasticity.Furthermore,combing with the anticipated tax rates from405 surveys from collectives and enterprises,we concluded that when the rates of stamp tax,maintenance and construction tax,education surtax,income tax,tenure tax,value added tax,and public facilities management tax,decrease to 0.04%,2.81%,4.56%,2.17%,13.11%,1.61 yuan/m²/year respectively,the anticipated tax rates（t’=104.02）can infinitely approach to the optimal tax（t*=107.88）,and the income distribution rate of government to collectives is 1/9;（2）in the process of construction land displacement,regarding peasants,collectives and corporations as our respondents,we took advantage of contingent valuation method（CVM）and choice experimental model（CE）to evaluate the value of transfer of land development right.The results manifest that the values of development right shifting from farmland to industrial land,commercial land and residential land are 948.56 yuan/m²,1500.07 yuan/m²,and 1811.76 yuan/m² respectively.Turing the value of development right back to peasants,we got the land income ratios among government,peasants in reclamation area and peasants in receiving areas are1:3.37:8.15.Even though they are less than the optimal shapely values,they still make a pareto improvement to some extent.