Cooperation Mode Selection And Information Sharing In An E-Tailing Supply Chain For Fresh Produce

With the rapid development of ‘Internet+’ fresh produce and the increasing demand of residents to buy fresh produce online,the online market scale of fresh produce keeps growing.The cooperation between the e-commerce platform and the fresh produce suppliers through various modes has become an important means to promote the development of fresh produce e-commerce.With the constant change of the social and economic environment,factors such as the seasonality of fresh produce,the diversity and randomness of consumer demand aggravate the demand uncertainty of fresh produce market,which brings severe challenges to the cooperation and operations management for the enterprises in the e-tailing supply chain for fresh produce.Specifically,consumers usually attach great importance to the product freshness while buying fresh produce online.Under uncertain market demand,the shortage or excess of investment in freshness-keeping resources will affect the overall operations efficiency of supply chain.Nevertheless,the e-commerce platform with information advantage can consider sharing information with suppliers to help them resist market risks and invest in freshness-keeping resources reasonably.However,the difference in cooperation mode between the supplier and the e-commerce platform will differentiate the information sharing motivation.Accordingly,how should supply chain members choose appropriate cooperation mode and implement information sharing strategy has become a critical problem for them to deal with the market demand volatility risk and maintain long-term stable cooperation.In view of this,aiming at an e-tailing supply chain for fresh produce,this paper comprehensively uses game theory,decision optimization,contract design and numerical simulation methods to study the cooperation mode selection and information sharing strategy.The influences of cooperation mode,freshness-keeping effort,freshness sensitivity,commission rate and competition intensity on the optimal decisions and profits of supply chain members are also explored.First,we consider a fresh produce supply chain where the supplier provides freshness-keeping effort and the e-commerce platform owns private demand information.Considering that demand is affected mainly by freshness and price,we model a multistage game and explore the supplier’s cooperation mode choice and the platform’s information sharing strategy.We also analyze how the interaction between the cooperation mode choice and information sharing strategy influences the supply chain performance.It shows that the platform may be beneficial or detrimental from information sharing,which depends on the freshness sensitivity and the supplier’s choice of cooperation mode.When the freshness sensitivity is low,the platform will withhold information under reselling while share information under agency selling.When the freshness sensitivity is high,the platform will share information under both modes.As information sharing benefits a responsive freshness-keeping effort,we reveal that the supplier may choose agency selling even at a high commission rate to induce information sharing.We also find that the supplier and the platform may achieve win-win cooperation under agency selling(reselling)at a low(high)commission rate.Specifically,compared with the strategy of information sharing under agency selling mode,the strategy of information sharing under reselling mode can benefit the supply chain due to the interaction of cooperation mdoe selection and information sharing.Then,to improve supply chain performance,we design incentive contracts to motivate information sharing and adjust the cooperation mode.After the strategy adjustment,we find that the supplier may adopt a strategy of high quality with a low price under agency selling,which is beneficial to consumers.Second,we aim at a fresh produce supply chain comprised of a supplier providing the freshness-keeping effort to maintain the product freshness and an e-commerce platform owning private demand information.To satisfy consumers’ diverse demands for fresh produce,the supplier may introduce competitive fresh produce through the reselling or agency channel of the platform.By modelling a multistage game under asymmetric information,we study the platform’s information sharing strategy and the supplier’s product introduction strategy.We also explore the interaction of the product introduction and information sharing strategies,and how the product introduction influences the platform’s profit.Our results indicate that the platform may share information voluntarily,depending on the competition intensity and freshness sensitivity.The platform’s motivation for information sharing may increase with the competition intensity,even if the competition is fierce.The supplier’s choice to introduce competitive fresh produce depends on the introduction cost,and the sales channel choice hinges on the commission rate,freshness sensitivity and forecast accuracy.Since information sharing promotes the product introduction strategy and vice versa,we reveal a complementary relationship between product introduction and information sharing strategies.Interestingly,we find that introducing competitive fresh produce may increase the demand for original fresh produce when the freshness sensitivity is high.However,the platform may suffer from introduction with agency selling even at a high commission rate in some cases.Thus,we suggest the supplier should compensate the platform in some cases.Finally,we consider that some suppliers with traditional channels begin to encroach online through the agency or reselling channel of the platform.By constructing a demand function affected by the price,product freshness and channel competition,we study the supplier’s online entry mode choice and the platform’s information sharing strategy.We also discuss the influence of information sharing and supplier encroachment on traditional channel,supply chain performance and consumer surplus.It reveals that the platform may share information,and the motivation for information sharing may increase with the channel competition.Surprisingly,increasing the commission fee may inhibit the platform’s motivation to share information under entry with agency selling.Information sharing benefits the supplier but may benefit or harm the retailer.When the forecast precision is high,the supplier selling products with low freshness sensitivity prefers entry with agency selling even at a high commission fee.Under the equilibrium strategy,the supplier may adopt the strategy of high quality with a low price or a high price.The demand for the traditional channel and the retailer’s profit may increase after supplier encroachment,indicating that supplier encroachment may achieve an all-win situation.