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Coordination And Information Sharing In An E-tailing Supply Chain For Fresh Produce With Freshness-keeping Effort And Value-added Service

Posted on:2021-03-27Degree:DoctorType:Dissertation
Country:ChinaCandidate:M L LiuFull Text:PDF
GTID:1489306464957519Subject:Management Science and Engineering
Abstract/Summary:PDF Full Text Request
With the rapid development of the Internet and the quick popularization of E-commerce,more and more enterprises are involved in the industry field of fresh e-commerce and sell fresh produce through online channels.Meanwhile,the consumption habits and attitudes of fresh produce consumers gradually change and upgrade.In addition to purchasing fresh produce online,consumers are increasingly interested in associated value-added service.Therefore,some fresh produce e-tailers provide value-added service to improve consumers' shopping experience and promote online purchase.Besides,some e-tailers cooperate with fresh produce suppliers who own the ability to deliver and preserve fresh produce.That is,suppliers invest freshness-keeping effort to deliver fresh produce to consumers.In the e-tailing supply chain for fresh produce,the freshness-keeping effort and value-added service are provided by different supply chain enterprises.The self-interested behaviour of enterprises may lead to the deviation in decision-making,and it is more complicated to realize the operation and management of the e-tailing supply chain for fresh produce efficiently.Thus,how to strengthen the cooperation between upstream and downstream enterprises for improving the supply chain performance is an important research topic.Besides,there are several uncertainties related to online sales of fresh produce,which aggravates the uncertainty of the operation of the supply chain.Demand uncertainty not only affects product decisions,but it also affects investment decisions of freshness-keeping and service resources in the supply chain.To better deal with market uncertainty and make resource investments more effectively,information sharing between supply chain enterprises becomes more and more critical.As a result,this thesis comprehensively applies the methods of game theory,decision optimization,contract design and numerical simulation,and aims at a supply chain consisting of a supplier who provides freshness-keeping effort and an e-tailer who provides value-added service.On this basis,this thesis studies coordination and information sharing in an e-tailing supply chain for fresh produce with freshness-keeping effort and value-added service,and investigates the impacts of critical factors on equilibrium decisions and profits of supply chain members.First,we consider the market demand for fresh produce is affected by the freshness-keeping effort and service level.By establishing supply chain game models under centralized and decentralized decision-making,we analyze the impacts of the freshness elasticity and service elasticity on optimal decisions and compare optimal decisions and profits in both models.On this basis,we design a revenue sharing and two-way cost sharing contract,which can realize the perfect coordination of the supply chain and Pareto improvement through reasonable adjusting contract parameters.Finally,we investigate the changes in optimal decisions under supply chain coordination.We find that the freshness-keeping effort and service level increase after supply chain coordination,but it could lead to a lower or higher retail price of fresh produce.When the freshness elasticity and service elasticity are relatively low,the e-tailer will decrease the retail price after coordination and implement the strategy of “high-quality with low price”.However,when the freshness elasticity or service elasticity is above a certain level,the e-tailer will increase the retail price after coordination and implement the strategy of “high-quality with high price”.Second,we consider that the e-tailer has private information about demand uncertainty and has the option to decide whether to share information with the supplier.By constructing supply chain game models under different information sharing scenarios,we investigate the e-tailer's information sharing strategy.Then,for the whole supply chain perspective,we study the information sharing incentive contract to achieve Pareto improvement of supply chain members.Finally,we discuss the impacts of information sharing on supply chain equilibrium decisions,consumer surplus and social welfare.We find that the e-tailer may share information with the supplier when the freshness elasticity is above a certain threshold.Information sharing cooperation is more likely to occur when the supplier is more economical in terms of freshness-keeping investment,or when the e-tailer is more efficient in terms of service investment.Besides,the freshness-keeping effort always improves under high demand information sharing while decreases under low demand information sharing,but the changes in the service level and retail price rely on the freshness elasticity.We also find that information sharing may improve or reduce the expected consumer surplus and social welfare.Finally,we consider that the e-tailer decides whether to share information and the supplier decides whether to encroach.By building supply chain game models under different information sharing scenarios,we discuss the supplier' encroachment strategy with or without information sharing and analyze the impact of supplier encroachment on the e-tailer.On this basis,by comparing the e-tailer's profit with and without information sharing,we investigate the e-tailer's information sharing strategy and the interaction between information sharing and encroachment strategies.Finally,we discuss the impact of the entry cost on supply chain members' equilibrium profits.We find that the supplier encroaches when the entry cost is relatively low under no information sharing or information sharing,respectively.When the competition intensity is relatively low or high,supplier encroachment may contribute to the e-tailer to profit more.We also find under the scenario that information sharing cannot change encroachment strategy,the e-tailer may share information with the supplier when the freshness elasticity is above a certain threshold.Under the scenario that information sharing can change encroachment strategy,the e-tailer may share information to induce supplier encroachment when the competition intensity is relatively low or high.When the competition intensity is moderate,the e-tailer may withhold information to deter the supplier from encroaching.
Keywords/Search Tags:E-tailing Supply Chain for Fresh Produce, Freshness-keeping Effort, Value-added Service, Supply Chain Coordination, Information Sharing
PDF Full Text Request
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