Research On The Sustainable Development And Mechanism Optimization Of Government-supported Agricultural Insurance Program

Agricultural insurance aims at risk management for agricultural producers,providing disaster loss compensation and risk guarantee,which is an important measure for countries all over the world to manage the agricultural risks,improve agricultural competitiveness and improve the farmers’ social welfare.Since 2007,China has established a Government-supported agricultural insurance program in the framework of PPP public-private cooperation.As an agricultural public policy implemented by the state to manage agricultural risks,the Government-supported agricultural insurance program has become an important part of China’s agricultural development and food security strategy.The policy goal requires it to be sustainable,and sustainable development is the core issue of Government-supported agricultural insurance program.In the face of increasingly complexity of Government-supported agricultural insurance program,the traditional insurance theories focus on the specific business processes or production technology of agricultural insurance,therefore it hardly seizing the features of Government-supported agricultural insurance program as a public policy.What is connotation of sustainable development of Government-supported agricultural insurance program? How to evaluate the level and the ability of sustainable development of Government-supported agricultural insurance program? Furthermore,how to design the mechanism of Government-supported agricultural insurance program to improve its sustainability?The above issue is related to the realization of the policy objectives of Government-supported agricultural insurance program.This thesis intends to regard the Government-supported agricultural insurance program as a huge complex system,and analyze the composition of the Government-supported agricultural insurance program complex system.And it assesses the sustainable development level in the light of public objectives of agricultural insurance policy,namely agricultural disaster loss compensation and agricultural risk guarantee degree.Furthermore,taking the central government,local governments,insurance companies and farmers as the game subjects,this thesis studies the decision-making evolution process of quaternary subjects in the complex environment,analyzes the factors affecting the strategic choice of each subject in Government-supported agricultural insurance program,explores the micro evolutionary dynamic mechanism of the system,finally evaluates the sustainable development ability of the system.At the last the thesis proposes mechanism optimization measures and countermeasures that can enhance the sustainability of the system.Firstly,this thesis reviews the research literatures systematically.It is found that the explanatory power and the depth of research are not enough,while the research perspectives and approaches are limited in the existing literature.Then it comes up with the research ideas and framework of this thesis.Secondly,this thesis provides the public economics,agricultural economics,complexity of the related theory of economics as the fundamental theories.On the base of the supply of public goods theory,it supposes the agricultural insurance is a kind of agricultural productive public goods,and its supply and production is divisible.By expounding the research progress of public choice theory on the hypothesis of government behavior,this thesis provides a basis for the subsequent analysis of government behavior and motivation,and the establishment of the quaternary evolutionary game model of central government-local government-insurance company-peasant household.Complexity economics and complex system theory provide a framework for understanding the structure of the Government-supported agricultural insurance program.Thirdly,this thesis shows the development situation of agricultural insurance and government subsidies in China.With the public goods production and supply theory,it discusses the production and supply separation mechanism of agricultural insurance and defines the government as provider and the insurers as producers in Government-supported agricultural insurance program.And it analyzes the reasons of Government-supported agricultural insurance program taking the framework of PPP public-private cooperation in China.Then in the light of political economics,by using public choice theory and complex system theory,it analyzes the structure,the constitution,the parties and the rules of the Government-supported agricultural insurance program.Moreover,it proposes the policy objectives of Government-supported agricultural insurance program,and the connotation of sustainable development of Government-supported agricultural insurance program.Fourthly,the thesis evaluates the sustainable development level and sustainable development ability of the Government-supported agricultural insurance program.As the goal of Government-supported agricultural insurance program is to manage the risk of agricultural industry,including compensating for agricultural disaster losses and providing agricultural risk guarantee.Therefore,this thesis evaluates the level of sustainable development from two dimensions: the actual compensation for agricultural disaster losses provided by Government-supported agricultural insurance program and the degree of agricultural guarantee provided by Government-supported agricultural insurance program.Based on the idea of "counterfactual",it takes the method of "regression synthesis" policy effect evaluation by using panel data to evaluate whether the Government-supported agricultural insurance program has narrowed the gap of agricultural disaster compensation in China.Also,it illustrates the guarantee level of agricultural insurance by analyzing the business data and statistical data of Government-supported agricultural insurance program.By employing evolutionary game theory,this thesis analyzes the interaction between stakeholders,including insurance companies,famers,the local governments and the central government.According to the theory of public choice,it explores the stakeholders’ behavioral characteristics under their intrinsic motivation and extrinsic motivation respectively.And it proposes the income function of four kinds of stakeholder to construct the replicator dynamics model,and finds the evolutionarily stable strategies.The economic meanings of the strategies are analyzed.Finally,the thesis puts forward some suggestions for the sustainable demand expression mechanism,cooperation mechanism,incentive mechanism and supervision mechanism of policy-based agricultural insurance system.