A Study On The Impact Of The Establishment Of State-owned Capital Investment And Operating Companies On The Innovation Of SOEs

Nowadays,the establishment of ‘state-owned capital investment and operation company’(hereinafter referred to as "two types of company establishment")is a key measure to deepen the reform of state-owned enterprises and establish a modern enterprise system.It is an important strategic goal in the period of China’s transformation economic development,and also the basic focus of building a socialist market economy system with Chinese characteristics.In the context of innovation-driven development strategy in the new era,whether the establishment of two types of companies can promote the innovation of holding state-owned enterprises is not only related to the stronger and better SOEs,but also affects the high-quality development of macro-economy.Although the existing researches on the reform of SOEs have formed relatively rich research conclusions and reform experience based on different reform scenarios,there are still some contradictions and conflicts in the theoretical aspects of the research conclusions.Different from the existing reform methods,the new round of state-owned assets and SOEs reform attempts to set up two types of companies to improve the existing state-owned assets supervision and management system from the institutional level.However,most relevant studies remain in the stage of theoretical discussion.A few empirical studies have explored the impact on the sensitivity of executive compensation performance based on the sample of central enterprises,or explored its comprehensive impact on enterprise performance,but lack the comprehensive analysis on the innovation of holding enterprises from the specific requirements and heterogeneity characteristics of stateowned assets management system reform.In view of this,this study takes the establishment of two types of companies as the research scenario.Based on the research samples of Shanghai and Shenzhen A-share state-owned listed companies from 2008 to 2019,it first tries to explore whether the establishment of the two types of companies has enhanced the core competitiveness and improved the innovation ability of SOEs,and what is the specific influencing mechanism or action path? Based on the dual perspectives of internal agency costs and external government intervention,this study finds that when the controlling shareholders of SOEs become two types of companies.It is helpful to alleviate the agency problem of senior executives,reduce the policy burden(excess employees)and improve the operation and management vitality of SOEs(increase joint innovation and hire more marketoriented professional managers),so as to significantly improve the innovation output of SOEs.After a series of robustness tests,such as PSM+DID and change of control group,this research conclusion remained unchanged.Then,based on the institutional background of the establishment of the two types of companies,we try to explore how the differences in the characteristics of the two types of companies will regulate their impact on the innovation output of the holding SOEs.The results show that,compared with state-owned capital operation companies,state-owned capital investment companies have more prominent effect on the innovation promotion of SOEs.Compared with the newly established companies,the two types of companies established by restructuring have more prominent role in promoting innovation.The increase of holding time is helpful to strengthen the innovation output of the two types of companies to the holding SOEs.The reduction of the pyramid level also has a positive effect on the innovation promotion effect of the two types of firm establishment.Further,in addition to the differences in the establishment characteristics of the two types of companies,will the innovation promotion effect of the establishment of the two types of companies be affected by the improvement of the internal and external governance mechanism of the holding SOEs? Based on the mixed ownership reform degree of holding SOEs(including the degree of equity integration and the high appointed board supervisor),the shareholding ratio of the largest shareholder and the internal governance mechanism embedded in the Party organization,as well as the product market competition in which the enterprise is located,the number of analyst tracking and Daisou audit and other perspectives of external governance mechanism,the regression results show that,When the mixed-ownership reform degree of holding soes is higher(i.e.better equity checks and balances and more obvious top governance),the shareholding ratio of the largest state-owned shares is higher,and the existence of Party organizations participating in corporate governance(i.e.party building into constitution),the positive impact of the establishment of two types of companies on the innovation output of holding soes is more significant.In addition,when SOEs are in fierce product market competition,more analyst tracking and audited by top ten accounting firms in China,the two types of company establishment have a more significant impact on the innovation output of holding SOEs.Finally,does the establishment of two types of companies not only increase the innovation output of enterprises,but also improve the innovation quality of SOEs? Based on the patent citation rate,innovation input-output efficiency and innovation output added value,the results show that the establishment of two types of companies not only promotes the increase of innovation output of SOEs,but also improves the quality of innovation,which is reflected in the obvious increase of patent citation times.It is further found that the establishment of the two types of firms not only increases the output of innovation,but also significantly increases the input of innovation,which leads to the synchronous improvement of the efficiency of innovation input-output and the added value of innovation output.An extended analysis based on the characteristics of the two types of firm establishment further found that The improvement effect of the two types of firms on innovation quality(including the number of patent citation,innovation input-output efficiency and innovation output added value)is more obvious in the sample of state-owned capital investment companies(but not operating companies),two types of restructured companies(but not newly established companies),and SOEs with longer holding duration and shorter pyramid level.Finally,based on the extensive analysis of the improvement of the governance mechanism of state-controlled enterprises,The improvement effect of the two types of companies on the quality of innovation(including the number of patent citation,innovation input-output efficiency and innovation output added value)is higher in the mixedownership reform of the holding SOEs(i.e.better equity checks and balances and more obvious high-level governance),the larger the proportion of the largest state-owned shares,the presence of Party organizations in corporate governance(i.e.the party building into the constitution),and the SOEs face more intense Product market competition,more analyst tracking and audit by the country’s top 10 accounting firms are more significant.The research conclusion of this thesis not only expands the research perspective of the existing literature on the reform of state-owned assets and SOEs and enterprise innovation,but also provides the corresponding experience reference and policy enlightenment for accelerating and deepening the reform of the state-owned assets management system and the authorized operation system of SOEs,which has both academic value and practical significance.Theoretical contribution level: On the one hand,relevant studies on government decentralization and mixed ownership reform of SOEs have found that both government decentralization and mixed ownership reform of SOEs can improve the operation efficiency of SOEs.However,at the same time,no matter delegating power between different levels of the government or delegating power to SOEs by increasing the pyramid level will help reduce the problem of executive agency of SOEs.In addition,delegating authority may worsen the management’s agency behavior to some extent.The research of this thesis finds that the establishment of the two types of companies can not only weaken the government intervention,but also strengthen the supervision and governance of the senior executives of SOEs,which helps to bridge and unify the existing relevant domestic and foreign researches.On the other hand,the relevant researches on how the reform of SOEs affects enterprise innovation are mostly based on government decentralization,mixed ownership reform and evaluation and incentive of senior executives of SOEs.Although the above researches unilaterally provide rich empirical evidence for the improvement of the quality and efficiency of the reform of SOEs,they ignore the externality of enterprise innovation and the quantity of enterprise innovation.Quality and efficiency and other aspects of the disunity of the problem.At the same time,based on the perspectives of innovation input,innovation output,innovation input-output efficiency and innovation output added value,this thesis systematically analyzes and reveals the overall impact of the establishment of two types of companies on enterprise innovation.In addition to bridging the paradox of existing researches on government policies,SOE reform and enterprise innovation,it also enriched the existing researches on the influencing factors of enterprise innovation at home and abroad.Practical significance: Firstly,the establishment of state-owned capital investment and operation companies is the strategic direction and important content of deepening the reform of SOEs in the new era.Based on the perspective of enterprise innovation,this thesis finds that the establishment of two types of companies has obvious innovation promotion effect.Therefore,the findings of this thesis provide corresponding policy enlightenment for the continuous and in-depth promotion of the reform of state-owned assets management system(especially from the central and local levels to actively guide and accelerate the transformation of state-owned assets supervision departments from ‘managing assets’ to ‘managing capital’).Secondly,combined with the different characteristics of the establishment of the two types of companies and the in-depth analysis of the internal and external governance mechanism of the holding SOEs,the prominent role,potential problems and influence boundary of the state-owned capital investment and the establishment of operating companies in the practical operation of the state-owned capital management system reform are systematically and comprehensively explored,revealed and summarized.In order to provide relevant experience for state-owned capital investment,the optimization and adjustment of pilot policies of operating companies and the continuous improvement of corporate governance mechanism of SOEs.Finally,in the context of the transformation of SOEs from ‘managing assets’ to ‘managing capital’,this thesis focuses on how SOEs controlled by state-owned capital investment and operation companies,in the process of transforming from state-owned operation to market-oriented operation,make use of the dividends of stateowned capital reform,how to strengthen enterprise R&D and innovation,It provides practical guidance to embed national development strategy into the concept and path of enterprise transformation and development.