Research On The Mechanism Of Action And Effect Of Land Trusteeship On The Chemical Fertilizer Reduction For Food Crops

At present,the problem of excessive chemical fertilization in China has shifted from saving chemical fertilizer,reducing weight,and controlling the total amount to a deeper structural contradiction of improving efficiency and ensuring stable production.In practice,land trusteeship,as a representative of service scale management,has developed rapidly in recent years with policy support,becoming a subjective and objective requirement for small farmers to integrate into modern agricultural development and an important way for farmland to lose weight on a scale.So,can the emergence of the land trusteeship production system solve the deeper problem of fertilizer reduction and achieve the strategic layout of storing grain in the land,reducing weight in farmland? Can the disintegration of traditional agricultural models break the contradiction of reducing structural chemical fertilizers? How can the new agricultural productive service model with land trusteeship as the core better play a role in reducing chemical fertilizer production? And so on have become scientific questions that the academic community urgently needs to think about and answer.This study takes farmers as the research object,based on the theory of professional division of labor,contract selection and other related theories,follows the logic idea of "clarifying the reduction effect-adjusting key constraints-building a development path-improving the reduction effect",and uses the field survey data of Shandong Province,using contingency reduction and System integration analysis methods,scientifically analyzes and empirically analyzes the internal mechanism of land trusteeship on grain crop chemical fertilizer reduction and the contract difference effect;Revealing the structural relationship of collaborative elements under the diversified implementation path of land trusteeship and the driving mechanism for enhancing the reduction effect of fertilizer under the participation of multiple main bodies.The main research conclusions are as follows:(1)There is still significant development space for the content and methods of land custody services,and the problem of excessive chemical fertilization of grain crops is still widespread.Under the obstacles of high hosting prices and concerns about service quality,some labor-based hosting services such as harvesting,chemical fertilization,and watering have been formed;There are certain differences in the selection ratio,degree of mechanized facilities,professional technical capabilities,and service satisfaction of different custody contracts.There is a common phenomenon of over chemical fertilization in wheat and corn grain crops,with an average over application rate of 6.239 kg/mu and 8.029 kg/mu,respectively.The over application of corn is more common than that of wheat,and the degree of over application of wheat is more severe than that of corn.(2)The transformation of the land trust agricultural production system is conducive to the realization of chemical fertilizer reduction,and different types of trust contracts have heterogeneous impacts on chemical fertilizer reduction.Land trusteeship can reduce 6.28%～26.17% of chemical fertilizer application for wheat and 3.89%～12.62% of chemical fertilizer application for corn,and 8.252 kg/mu and 4.551 kg/mu of chemical fertilizer application for wheat and corn by improving resource allocation effect,scientific and technological progress effect and input Substitution effect.Different land trust contracts will have a differential effect on chemical fertilizer reduction.Written formal contracts and shared settlement contracts have the greatest increase in wheat fertilizer reduction,reaching 10.96kg/mu and 14.64 kg/mu,respectively.Long term stable contracts have the greatest increase in corn fertilizer reduction,reaching 15.64 kg/mu.Compared to the cooperation agreement between the two parties,the multi-party cooperation agreement has the lowest ability to improve the reduction of fertilizer application for wheat and corn,with 4.447 kg/mu and 6.341kg/mu,respectively.(3)The heterogeneous impact of land trusteeship on the reduction of grain crop chemical fertilizers from the perspective of contracts is essentially the difference in farmers’ choices of land trusteeship contract types based on transaction costs and behavioral abilities,which are jointly constrained by transaction characteristics,transaction costs,property rights capabilities,and social abilities.The specificity of human assets,operational risks,transaction risks,production scale,operational scale,search costs,negotiation costs,and property rights behavior have a significant negative impact on the realization of chemical fertilizer reduction.Under the participation of trusteeship,the selection of efficient chemical fertilizer reduction contracts is constrained by the level of material assets,production scale,transaction scale,search costs,and negotiation costs,which reduces the degree of reduction;Production risk and market risk can generate efficient chemical fertilizer reduction under the positive impact of the selection of long-term stable contracts and shared settlement contracts.The social skills of farmers are a double-edged sword,and there are significant differences in adjusting transaction costs for the selection of different types of efficient contracts.This can reduce the inhibitory effect of negotiation costs on written formal contracts and improve the effectiveness of chemical chemical fertilizer reduction,while also increasing the inhibitory effect of negotiation costs on the selection of multi-party collaborative contracts.(5)The complex relationship between institutional environment and service outsourcing provides different driving paths for the realization of chemical fertilizer reduction.There are synergy differences and multiple configuration strategies among factors in farmers’ choice of efficient chemical fertilizer reduction contracts.The factor environment with land trusteeship as the core provides four Strategy pattern for the reduction of high chemical fertilizer:outsourcing oriented,risk averse,economies of scale and breakthrough innovative;At the same time,in the balanced development and policy led super-high chemical fertilizer reduction configuration strategies,the balance of internal and external resources of farmers and the participation of the government’s "re pushing hand" are the core conditions for improving chemical fertilizer reduction,which cannot be separated from the intervention of external environments such as society and government.There is a complex relationship of symbiosis,substitution,and complementarity among the internal components of different strategies,especially in the context of service outsourcing,where the synergistic symbiosis between agricultural land scale and behavioral capabilities drives the implementation of chemical fertilizer reduction.The strong competitive complementarity between government regulations and subject cognition,as well as the alternative relationship between agricultural land scale and production risks,promote the diversification of efficient chemical fertilizer reduction contract configuration strategy choices.(5)There are different interest driven mechanisms among government departments,trust organizations,and farmers,and the game equilibrium of the three parties is influenced by multiple factors within and outside the system.Changes in investment costs,expected returns,and compensation situations will change the equilibrium state and evolution rate of the subject’s behavioral strategy;The government has a certain limit on the subsidy and compensation for entrusted organizations and operating farmers.Excessive compensation standards can lead to an increase in dominant pressure,a decrease in efficiency,and even a shift in system equilibrium strategies.Faced with complex system relationships and diverse evolutionary equilibria,from within the system to information asymmetry and conflicting interest orientations,internal driving mechanisms for interest coordination and information disclosure have been proposed;From the aspect of the government’s supervision of Adverse selection and avoidance of rent-seeking behavior,this paper puts forward the middle driving mechanism of reward and punishment constraint mechanism and risk hedging mechanism;From the perspective of external market supply and demand relationships and efficient allocation capabilities,an outer driving mechanism of price adjustment mechanism and innovative development mechanism has been proposed.Based on the above analysis,the following policy recommendations are proposed:(1)At the farmer level.Increase policy promotion,reduce risk perception,increase participation in land trusteeship,and increase enthusiasm for fertilizer reduction;Optimize the service environment,implement dynamic compensation,and establish a "diversified and precise" reduction matching model and selection path;Establish information platforms,accelerate information circulation,and weaken the benefits and negative impacts caused by information asymmetry.(2)At the organizational level of custody.Add special funds and related service subsidies,accelerate the deepening of professional division of labor,and achieve supply side structural reform;Pay attention to the integration of custody contract and service quality,promote the redevelopment of transaction efficiency,and improve the sense of custody Organizational identification;Adhere to the coordinated development of industries and the integration of three industries,continuously improve the socialized service system,and expand the demand for green markets.(3)At the government level.Coordinating social and economic resources,emphasizing the role of market innovation,and consolidating the modern agricultural market economy and funding sources;Establish a market supervision group,improve various supervision systems,and consolidate the sustainability of ecological and economic benefits in reducing fertilizer production;Add channels for interest demands,balance the interests of the main parties,and achieve internal compensation for external effects and interest conflicts.