On Wittgenstein's Private Language Argument

On Wittgenstein's Private Language ArgumentWittgenstein's private language argument is the important part of his post-thinking. Because of his unique way of thinking and Style of writing, many philosophers discussed intensely for the private language, but they all wrote their own theories, So far, there is no assent conclusion. In this paper, on the base of referring to and digesting the studying fruits of ancestors, the dissertation endeavors to interpret and illustrate Wittgenstein's argument against private language.Private language was proposed formally first by Wittgenstein in his later book, "Philosophy", which caused widespread concern in the private language. But the private language is not the invention of Wittgenstein, and the appearance of the private language in the history of philosophy has its extensive history. Firstly, the dualism of mind and body in Descartes' philosophy has laid a foundation for the concept of the private language in the form of metaphysics. Secondly, the Locke's theory of the alleged significance provides a direct source for the appearance of the private language. In addition, both Russell's acquaintance theory and Husserl's theory of intentionality are related to the proposition of the subject of the private language closely. Therefore, Wittgenstein's private language is not groundless, it has a deep philosophical background and a profound theoretical source.Wittgenstein put forward his argument on the private language just in the context of this theory. He held a negative attitude to the existence of private language and refuted the system of private language in his later thought. His refutation can be divided into three steps. Firstly, we can not give the definition of a feeling experience only with its name directly. According to the traditional view, with a direct process of the private you can give a name to the sense of the private then, as long as they are similar between the later feeling and the first examples of the original instructions and definitions used to indicate the name, he will be able to use this name to instruct the feeling of others. In Wittgenstein's opinion, the private ostensive definition is not a valid grammar rule, because we will not be able to introduce a kind of ostensive definition of the initial conditions reliably in principle, and in new circumstances we can not prove that the usage of a name is right. We do not have standards to distinguish between the proper use and the improper use of a name. Under such circumstances, perhaps someone will turn to memory or imagination. However, Wittgenstein pointed out that memory or imagination is a subjective standard rather than an objective criteria. To judge something in subjective needs for the objective criteria, that is, the process to judge internally require the external standards which exists among the human behavior. There are no such standards in the private language, so the private ostensive definition is invalid, and the private language could not exist. Secondly, Wittgenstein pointed out that even if private ostensive definition is possible, nor can the name resulting from it be useful for the others. If a person had to own pain as a model to imagine the pain of others, that this is far from easy, because I must imagine the pain that I did not feel according to the pain I feel. Even if I draw the concept of "pain" from my personal experience, I can not imagine how the pain of others is going on. Finally, Wittgenstein pointed out furtherly that even if private ostensive definition is possible, and we can apply the name which is coming from it to others meaningfully, but I still can not follow this model to illustrate the concept of "common language ". Everyone's private feelings are not important in the game of the language, they can not play its due role in the game of the language. We are not able to explain the actual use of common language from the private language model, because a gap exists between the language in the public and the language in the private. He stressed that instead from the individual's inner experience, we should find the description of the public language from the external behavior.For Wittgenstein's wonderful discussion on the impossibility of private language, Kripke provides a unique interpretation to it. He reflect from the comparation between the observation of rules and the private language, coming to the conclusion that we can not follow the rules secretly. To stress furtherly, he confirms the impossibility of private language directly. It is firm to say that Kripke's interpretation has far-reaching significance in the philosophical circles. He has provided a unique theoretical perspective for later researchers on Wittgenstein.Wittgenstein's argument on the private language is highly commendable in the western philosophical circles. Because, this argument has a glorious meaning in history. On the one hand, it has a significant role in deepening the later thought of Wittgenstein. On the other hand, it has a profound impact on the philosophy of behaviorism and the physical and mental problems.