Games Analysis Of Enterprise Credit Behaviors

Market Economy is not only based on merchandises and legal institutions, but also credit. However the credit environment is not so good in our country at present and to some extent credit crisis has appeared. Because enterprise is the basic economic cell and enterprise credit is the most widespread credit form, lack of enterprise credit has become the most serious problem. And enterprise is the expression of its credit behaviors. So from the particular angle of information and using game and mathematical analysis, this paper study the choices of enterprise credit behaviors and its internal and exterior incentives, the fundamental use of information. Therefore, as the far-research and creation of enterprise credit mechanism, the research has an important theoretical value and realistic meaning.Because lack of enterprise credit mainly shows at exterior behavior relation with other enterprises, banks and consumers, this paper concentrates on studying the exterior credit relations and other relevant issues. In the foundation of overview of related theories, the paper defines the enterprise credit and enterprise credit behaviors. Enterprise credit is the accumulation and synthesize of its credit behaviors. Influenced by several factors such as enterprise performances, scale of enterprise, market competition degrees and market growth degrees, enterprise credit is the result of internal drives and exterior pressures. Theoretical research is consists of three parts: enterprise credit behaviors analysis under perfect information, under imperfect information and under regulation. Based on mutual principal-agent game model under perfect information, the paper studied the term of cooperation game in finite repeated games and put forward two different ways to realize cooperation: to control higher costs of opportunism and having a long-term cooperation relationship. From the angle of information, the paper redefines anti-credit and put forward respective mechanisms of preventing anti-credit. By using game models under imperfect information, we get the term to bring about separating equilibrium of different types of agents: the honest agent is willing to pay more credit investments than that of the dishonest one. From two different angles of the regulaorbeing "the-third part" and the opponent, we study the different functions of government and the credit intermediate organizations in establishing and maintaining enterprise credit and constructed theoretical base of respective policing advices. At last, the paper study the exterior factors—government, credit intermediate organizations and the social credit environment. The synthesized function of exterior forces is to create a stable, equitable, impartial and open market environment. In practice the function is come true through social credit systems and the most important task of social credit systems is to solve the problem of asymmetric information between market dealers. Based on all of the above study, suggestions of respective policies are put forward.