The Research In Restraint-incentive Scheme For Top-managers Of State-owned Enterprises

Our current restraint-incentive scheme for top managers in state-owned enterprises wears a strong flavour of planned economy, which fails to meet the request of marketing economy. This incorrespondence blocks the striding of the production capacity of the enterprises and also results in the loss of state-owned capitals. So it is critical to solve the problem. The principal-agent problem commonly exists in current enterprises whose right of management is separated from the right of property. And the only solution is to set up an efficient restraint-incentive scheme for the top managers. The special character of the state-owned enterprise results in the speciality and complexity of this scheme. Therefore, the practical and theoretical problem we have to face is how to establish an effective restraint-incentive scheme for top-managers in state-owned enterprises.Trie thesis is made up of five chapters. Chapter one analyses the origin of the problem of restraint and incentive in the state-owned enterprise. Chapter two compares the above-mentioned problems in a worldwide scope, especially in those developed countries. Chapter three addresses the situation of the scheme of restraint-incentive in our country's enterprises. Chapter four analyses the possibility of reengineering the scheme in nowadays. And in the last chapter, the author submits some practical methods in building a more efficient restraint-incentive scheme.