Associating Property With Pre-empt And Not

This paper explores economic analysis on utilizing valley water resource under the clue of associating property with pre-empt or not. It is difficult to successfully put the rule of not associating property with pre-empt into practice, owing to Water resource's physical character. The terrain distribution of water resource presents river valleys that belong to the common pool resource. So the valley is a unit, which can't be partitioned, to establish the rule of not associating property with pre-empt and standardize the water resource utilization. Ostrom's eight principle of system design are the criteria that are used to evaluate the success of common pool resource governing.Government is frequently the provider of property rules. The rules of associating property with pre-empt are both incentives to exploitation of water resource, and economization in government expense of executing property rules. But the rules of associating property with pre-empt often result in over-investment in contesting water resource when water resource becomes scarce. The rules of not associating property with pre-empt can restrain over-investment, but it needs great executive cost. In order to gain maximum social benefits, the government will choose the best rules of not associating property with pre-empt. Coase theorem can be used to analyze the choice behavior of the government's ownership collocation.Introducing multi interest groups, it can be found that the rule of not associating water resource property with pre-empt is the end of property contracting. These interest groups can be divided into three kinds: politician, bureaucracy and private property claimer. The factors to influence the end of property contracting can be summarized as follows: (i ) the scale of expected total returns; (ii ) the number of competitive interest groups; (iii) the difference between property contracting parties; (iv ) information issue; ( v ) the concentrated degree of current and proposing wealth distribution.Based on above theory analyses, this paper analyzes the water resource utilization in the Talimuhe valley as a case: firstly, introducing the distribution of water resource in the talimuhe valley under the rule of associating property with pre-empt; secondly, generalizing over-investment in utilizing water resource in Talimuhe valley; finally, describing the difficult course of establishing the rule of not associating property with pre-empt.From the analyses, the following conclusions are draw: the localization of the principle of pre-empt in resource exploitation, the determinate of resource character to the property establishment, the essential of government authority to property collocation, the importance of resource utilizer to property contracting. Meanwhile, this paper's inspiration to administer Chinese valley water crisis is: (i ) we should properly handle relations between regulating water by institution and by engineering; (ii) we should properly handle relations between valley administration and local administration; (iii) we should properly handle relations between valley structure administration and second-valley structure administration; (iv ) we should properly handle relations between valley exploitation and environmental protection; ( v ) concerned about the projects for south water to north.