An Analysis Of The Welfare Of Shell Resource Allocations In China's Securities Market

This dissertation is focused on the welfare of Shell resource allocations. In the chapter of analyzing the primary allocation of Shell resource, the author emphasizes that ineffectual rent-seeking leads to great damage to the social welfare, and he also points out that auction will not eliminate rent-seeking and the only way to do so is deregulation through a 3 levels analysis of the auction system.In the chapter of analyzing the secondary allocation of Shell resource, the author illustrates that coming into the stock market through buying the shares of companies already in the market is a Pareto improvement through discussion of bargaining model.In the general analysis of the above two levels of allocations, the author analyzes the welfare of Shell resource with the tool of Coase theorem. He argues that, if only the market is efficient, the primary allocation may not be as important as we think to social welfare, and the improvement of the subsystem should not be at the price of sacrificing the national welfare from the perspective of the general system.The author further studies the institution change of Shell resource of our country, and he argues that this process is a Pareto improvement itself for its self-executive factors.At last, the author concludes that the dilemma of reducing the proportion of shares held by the government shows that the reform of China's capital market has fallen into a gradual trap. For this problem, the author put forward 2 resolutions as follows: one is that the government may break the rigidity of interest structure with its dominant position, the other is that the government may carry out further institutional reforms in related domains of the capital market with the introduction of Big Bang reform when proper opportunities come.